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1 Introduction 
“Trust is good, control is better.” This famous quote attributed to Lenin refers to a fundamental 
question in any principal-agent relationship: To what extend should the principal leave discretion 
to the agent? Standard principal-agent theory suggests that discretion should be limited as much 
as possible; otherwise the agent will either exploit his freedom to shirk or he will have to be 
offered expensive monetary incentives to choose actions that are in the principal's interest.1 
Similarly, Taylorism, the dominant paradigm of scientific workplace organization in the first 
two-thirds of the 20th century, is based on the assumption that workers will always work at the 
slowest rate that goes unpunished. Standardization of the production process is therefore 
essential, so that that the workers’ efforts can be effectively monitored and controlled.  
More recent human resource management (HRM) theories, however, stress the cost of 
control. A worker who has to follow strict and tightly controlled rules cannot use his private 
information and ingenuity to solve problems “on the floor,” and his productivity decreases 
because he cannot adapt his actions to changes in his environment. Modern high-performance 
work systems (HPWS) decentralize the gathering and processing of information and grant 
authority to workers to act on this information as they see fit in order to solve the problems that 
arise.2 This strategy reduces the cost of control and increases productivity, but it makes the 
company vulnerable. It remains at the worker’s discretion whether to use his authority to benefit 
his company or to shirk. 
In this paper, we address the fundamental trade-off between efficiency of effort and 
control of effort that underlies the different forms of work organization. We show experimentally 
that offering discretion to an agent is not profitable on its own. However, if offering discretion 
improves the agent’s productivity in addition to being combined with high fixed wages that offer 
a high share of the surplus to the agent, and if the principal can screen agents based on their past 
behavior, this combined strategy becomes profitable. Put differently, we show that offering 
discretion, paying high wages, and screening are complements. Complementarities imply that 
                                                 
1 If the agent has fewer actions to choose from, fewer incentive compatibility constraints have to be satisfied. Thus, 
the implementation of an action becomes cheaper if the agent has less discretion. Furthermore, Grossman and Hart 
(1983) show that having a more informative signal about the agent’s action reduces the implementation cost. Thus, 
having additional information through more monitoring and control, i.e., less discretion, is always beneficial.  
2 See, e.g., Lawler, Mohrman and Ledford (1995), Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg (2000), and Ichniowski 
and Shaw (2003) for an overview of the different forms that these work systems can take. 
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different components of a strategy reinforce each other and therefore lead to a bundling or 
clustering of these components.  
In our experiments, we document the endogenous emergence of two distinct clusters of 
job characteristics based on two fundamentally distinct strategies – a control strategy and a trust 
strategy. Under the control strategy, the employers offer jobs characterized by limited effort 
discretion, a low requested effort, and low wages that grant only a low share of the surplus. 
Under the trust strategy, the employers offer jobs with high effort discretion, they request a high 
effort, and they pay high wages that grant a high share of the surplus. In other words, the trust 
strategy is to offer “good” jobs, while the control strategy is associated with “bad” jobs. While 
the trust strategy is clearly beneficial for employees, it requires a considerable amount of trust on 
the part of the employer. He pays a higher wage and – due to the greater effort discretion – he 
risks increased employee shirking. Thus, if the employee is not trustworthy, the employer incurs 
a significant loss, which raises the question how the trust strategy can be viable.  
Our experimental treatments identify key economic conditions under which the trust 
strategy is superior to the control strategy. We show, in particular, that opportunities to screen 
employees based on signals about past performance are decisive for the viability of the trust 
strategy. In the absence of such screening opportunities – in our base treatment – the large 
majority of employees shirked and the employers predominantly implemented the control 
strategy. In contrast, an imperfect signal about employees’ past performance was provided in our 
screening treatment, and many employers in this treatment conditioned their job offers on this 
signal. Employees with a signal indicating high past performance obtained good jobs in the 
majority of cases, while almost all employees with low signals received bad job offers. The 
employers’ screening behavior generated incentives for the employees to increase effort in order 
to improve their reputations, which led to a substantial increase in employees’ average effort in 
the screening treatment compared to the base treatment.  
It is important, however, to point out that the reputation formation opportunities in the 
screening treatment did not induce employees to provide high effort per se. Employees with a 
high performance signal tended to reciprocate reliably high wages with a high level of effort, but 
they withdrew their effort if they received a low wage offer, even if this hurt their reputation and 
lowered their expected future payoffs. This behavior forced principals to pay high wages if they 
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wanted to elicit high effort. However, by offering high wages only to high-reputation employees, 
employers could limit the risk associated with paying the high wage upfront. 
Although the possibility of screening employees leads to an increase in the provision of 
good jobs and higher effort, it does not suffice for bringing the market to the efficiency frontier 
because a significant fraction of employers only used the control strategy. These employers 
never experienced that paying high wages to high reputation employees pays off. There is also a 
non-negligible minority of employees who always shirked even though investing in a good 
reputation would have been profitable. Similar to employers who never trust, these employees 
never learned that reciprocating to high wage offers by choosing high effort levels increases 
future income.  
This interaction of heterogeneous employees and employers gives rise to a segmentation 
of the labor market. In the screening treatment, some employees work hard, acquire a good 
reputation, and tend to be offered good jobs. Other employees shirk, are left with a poor 
reputation, and get stuck with bad jobs. Our results show that in an environment where screening 
and reputation building is possible, employees who only consider their narrow, short-term self-
interest are more likely to end up in work environments that are tightly controlled and leave no 
rents on the table, while employees who behave reciprocally – for intrinsic or strategic reasons – 
are more likely to get good jobs that leave them more discretion and offer higher rents. 
What determines the relative size of these two segments in the labor market? To address 
this question, we implemented a third treatment that adds labor market competition to the 
screening treatment. We show that competition among employers for high reputation employees 
and among employees for good job offers increases the incentives for employees to acquire a 
high reputation and for employers to condition job offers on past performance, and it fosters 
learning such that most market participants behave (close to) optimally. Employers realize that 
they will not be able to hire employees with good track records by offering bad jobs. Employees 
realize that they will be left behind if they do not have a good reputation. As a result, the fraction 
of good jobs increases significantly, and both employers and employees benefit from the 
introduction of competition. 
Our paper contributes to the economics, HRM, and industrial relations literatures that 
analyze the determinants and effectiveness of different forms of workplace organization. The 
theoretical literature (Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1995; Kandel and Lazear 1992; Baker, 
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Gibbons, and Murphy 1994; Holmström and Milgrom 1994) suggests that important 
complementarities between technology, strategy, and incentive systems exist. Ichniowski, Shaw 
and Prennushi (1997), the work summarized in Ichniowski and Shaw (2003), and MacLeod and 
Parent (1999) provide evidence consistent with the view that there are complementarities 
between job characteristics, different HRM practices, and the form of compensation. In addition, 
there is convincing evidence (reviewed in Ichniowski and Shaw 2003) that HPWS are frequently 
more productive than more traditional job designs. To the best of our knowledge, however, the 
previous empirical literature did not explicitly identify the causal factors behind the actual 
implementation and the viability of HPWS.3 In fact, one of the enduring puzzles in this literature 
is why only some firms implement HPWS, despite the prospect of productivity gains, while 
others do not (see, e.g., Osterman 1994; Ichniowski and Shaw 1995, 2003; Ichniowski et al. 
1997; Pfeffer 2007; Liu, Guthrie, Flood and MacCurtain 2009). Our experiments show that, first, 
opportunities to screen employees for work attitude and second, labor market competition are 
key causal forces behind the prevalence and viability of the trust strategy. In addition, we 
identify the mechanisms through which these causal forces exert their influence. 
Our data allow, in particular, a clean identification of the complementarities between high 
efficiency wages, effort discretion, and screening, i.e., we can explicitly document that 
interactions between these variables have large effects on profits. We show, first, that the 
marginal profit of a wage increase is negative in the absence of screening opportunities but 
positive in the screening treatment if the employer can restrict the payment of efficiency wages 
to medium and high reputation employees. Second, we show that the marginal profit of a wage 
increase for employees with a medium or high reputation is much higher under full discretion 
than under limited discretion. Third, our data indicate that effort discretion and screening are 
complements because full discretion has a negative (or zero) impact on profits in the absence of 
screening opportunities, while full discretion has a large positive impact in the screening 
treatment if employers limit it to medium and high reputation employees who receive high 
efficiency wages. Taken together, these complementarities explain why employers bundle the 
                                                 
3 Huang and Cappelli (2010), who document interesting correlations between the intensity of firms’ screening for 
employees with a high work morale and other job characteristics, write: “In future research, it would be interesting 
to examine the causality in these relationships as well as the factors that may cause them to vary, such as whether 
higher dismissal costs lead to greater screening of all kinds and how screening for different attributes might vary 
with labor market conditions.” 
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job attributes in two fundamentally distinct job designs, i.e., why they either rely on the control 
strategy or on the trust strategy. Moreover, the data also indicate that the screening opportunity 
and competition are complements because competition strengthens both employers’ incentives 
for conditioning job design on employees’ reputation and employees’ incentives to acquire a 
good reputation.  
The HRM and industrial relations literature often points out that screening is correlated 
with HPWS (see, e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). Our findings suggest that screening for a 
particular employee characteristic, namely, the willingness to provide high effort, is key. A 
recent paper by Huang and Cappelli (2010) indeed shows that “screening for work attitude” is a 
strong predictor of important components of HPWS such as low monitoring, high wages, and 
team work, while screening for skills and work experience is not. Likewise, a paper by Green 
(2008) shows that British workers whom their company classifies as loyal enjoy higher effort 
discretion, a result also consistent with the notion that employers screen their employees 
according to their loyalty (reputation) and offer the loyal employees better jobs.  
Our paper is also related to the theoretical and empirical literature on reputation 
formation (e.g., Fama 1980; Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson 1982; MacLeod and 
Malcomson 1998; Holmström 1999; MacLeod 2007; Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004; Huck, Lünser 
and Tyran 2006), gift exchange (e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Charness, Fréchette and 
Kagel 2004) and screening (e.g., Cabrales, Miniaci, Piovesan and Ponti 2010). Our data support, 
for example, the prediction of Holmström’s model (1999) that employees work hard in 
equilibrium if the market infers their productivity from past performance. Although our set-up 
differs from his model in various ways, our data corroborate the model's key prediction that 
reputational incentives enhance effort provision, even in one-shot interactions. However, none of 
the above papers investigates the role of screening and competition based on past performance 
signals for an employer’s solution to the fundamental trade-off between efficiency of effort and 
control of effort that underlies different forms of work organization such as Taylorist or HPWS.4 
Our findings also have a bearing on the sources of segmented labor markets – as 
described, for example, in Doeringer and Piore (1971) – and suggest a new reason for the 
coexistence of good and bad jobs. Bulow and Summers (1986) and Saint-Paul (1997) link the 
                                                 
4 The study of Cabrales et al. (2010) has a rather different focus. In their set-up, there is a trade-off between fairness 
and robustness to strategic uncertainty. They find that while strategic uncertainty aversion is a stronger determinant 
of choices than fairness, agents prefer to work for principals with similar distributional concerns.  
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existence of dual labor markets to technological factors that determine, for example, monitoring 
costs. Since “technology” is constant across our treatments, our findings suggest that employers' 
suboptimal choices and employees' narrowly self-interested behavior also contribute to 
segmentation. A non-negligible minority of the employees behaved in a narrowly self-interested 
way in the screening treatment because they did not reciprocate high wages with high effort, 
even though this damaged their reputations and future incomes. In addition, a substantial 
minority of employers did not condition job design on employees' track records, although this 
would have been more profitable. If competition prevails, however, suboptimal behavior is 
largely removed and labor market segmentation tends to vanish. This finding further indicates 
that the extent of individual rationality may not just be a personality trait, but may also be 
affected by the degree of competition in a market.  
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the impact of control and extrinsic 
incentives on intrinsic motivation and voluntary cooperation (e.g., Frey 1997; Fehr and 
Rockenbach 2003; Falk and Kosfeld 2006; Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008). In particular, Falk 
and Kosfeld show experimentally that some agents reduce voluntary effort provision if the 
principal chooses to control them. These “hidden costs of control” may, therefore, diminish the 
principals’ incentive to limit the agents’ discretion, i.e., to control them, even in the absence of 
screening opportunities. Although our data are consistent with the existence of hidden costs of 
control, they also suggest that these costs are not sufficiently high (in our setting) to induce the 
employers to forgo their control option. In the absence of screening opportunities, the vast 
majority of the employers converge towards the control strategy because it is more profitable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the experimental 
design and procedural details. In Section 3, we discuss the behavioral implications for our set-up 
if (i) all subjects are self-interested, (ii) a share of the subjects also has a preference for fairness 
and (iii) hidden costs of control exist. Section 4 presents and discusses the experimental results 
on the clustering of job attributes, the employers’ optimal and actual strategies, the existence of 
suboptimal employers and employees in the screening treatment, and the resulting segmentation 
of the labor market. In this section we also analyze the effects of labor market competition. 
Section 5 discusses the empirical relevance of our experiment and its relation to other 
explanations of HPWS. Section 6 concludes. A supplementary online appendix contains 
additional analyses and the experimental instructions.  
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2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
Consider an employer who hires an employee for production. The employee generates a 
monetary gross profit eb   if he expends effort e . The parameter 1b   reflects the employee’s 
efficiency. Gross profits, b e , accrue directly to the employer. The employee incurs private 
effort costs ( )c e  measured in monetary terms, with eec )( , but receives a wage w  from the 
employer. Payoffs are thus given by b e w     for the employer and by U w e   for the 
employee. There is a conflict of interest as the employer prefers high effort and low wages while 
the employee prefers low effort and high wages.  
The employer can offer an employment contract to the employee that specifies a fixed 
wage w  and a requested, non-binding, effort level e~ .5 The wage must at least cover the costs of 
the requested effort and cannot exceed 50w  . The contract can neither condition on effort, or 
effort costs, nor on gross profits. If the employee rejects the contract offer, no wage is paid, no 
effort is exerted, and both parties receive their reservation utilities of 0. If the employee accepts, 
the employer must pay the offered wage, irrespective of the actual effort the employee chooses.  
There are two types of contracts that the employer can offer: a contract with full 
discretion and a contract with limited discretion. These contract types differ in two dimensions: 
1. Feasible effort levels: In a contract with full discretion, the employee can choose 
any effort level between e 1, 2, …, 10, whereas he must choose an effort level 
of at least 3 in a contract with limited discretion, i.e., e 3, 4, …, 10, given he 
accepts the contract. 
2. Efficiency: The effort efficiency of the relationship is characterized by 5b  in a 
contract with full discretion, while the efficiency parameter is only 4b  in a 
contract with limited discretion. 
This experimental design captures the fundamental trade-off between efficiency and 
control described in the HRM literature.6 Limiting discretion forces employees to obey some 
                                                 
5 The purpose of the requested effort level is to coordinate expectations. The principal can communicate what he 
considers to be an adequate effort choice for the offered wage. From a game theoretic perspective the requested 
effort level is just cheap talk. However, the literature on HRM and HPWS emphasizes the importance of extensive 
labor-management communications (see, e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw 2003, p. 164). One of the HRM practices that 
are considered in Ichniowski et al. (1997) explicitly measures whether efforts were made “to set clear expectations 
about required work behaviors of the new workers” (p. 294).  
6 The efficiency gains from higher task discretion and lower control are vividly described in Walton (1985, p. 77) 
who writes that “workers respond best – and most creatively – not when they are tightly controlled by management, 
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minimum standards, which is reflected in the higher minimum effort level. But limiting 
discretion also restricts employees’ ability to work more smartly, that is, to react in a flexible and 
efficient way to a changing environment. For example, the employer can establish strict 
production procedures to tightly govern the employee’s actions, regulate working hours by using 
time cards to monitor attendance, or impose reporting obligations to better assess performance. 
However, regulated working hours force the employee to work when he might not be most 
productive, reporting obligations absorb the employee’s time and attention, and strict production 
procedures forfeit other, possibly more efficient practices. The harder the employee works, the 
more costly restricting his actions becomes. This is reflected by the reduction of the efficiency 
parameter b. All employers and employees know the payoff functions, the set of feasible 
contracts, and hence the efficiency implications of limited discretion. 
We start out with two treatments, the base treatment and the screening treatment. Each 
treatment involves 15 periods. In each period, an employer is randomly matched with one of the 
employees to preclude repeated game effects. In the base treatment, the employer does not 
receive any information about his current employee, while he receives an imperfect signal about 
his current employee’s track record in the screening treatment: he is informed about his current 
employee’s effort choices in the last three periods.7 Note that an employer neither observes the 
contract types, the wage offers, nor the requested effort levels that his current employee faced in 
the last three periods. The employers are thus not perfectly informed about their employees; a 
low effort choice, for example, can indicate an untrustworthy employee who was offered a high 
wage or a reciprocal employee who was offered a low wage. Employees know that future 
                                                                                                                                                             
placed in narrowly defined jobs, and treated like an unwelcome necessity, but, instead, when they are given broader 
responsibilities, encouraged to contribute, and helped to take satisfaction in their work.” In broadly defined jobs, 
employees can play “a significant role in solving problems and improving methods” which is thought to “boost in-
plant quality, lower warranty cost, cut waste, raise machine utilization and total capacity with the same plant and 
equipment, reduce operating and support personnel, reduce turnover and absenteeism, and speed up implementation 
of change” (Walton 1985, p. 81). Note that many of the factors mentioned by Walton involve a higher productivity 
of effort, i.e., a given effort level generates higher value for the firm if effort can be exerted in broadly defined jobs 
and if employees are free to decide how they perform their tasks. The more recent literature on HPWS (e.g., 
Ichniowski et al.1997, Appelbaum et al. 2000, Osterman 2006) confirms that not only technology and skill but also 
the organization of the workplace (e.g., information sharing, allocation of substantial decision rights, careful 
recruiting, and training) affects productivity. On the downside, HPWS impede the effective control of employees; in 
the words of Osterman: “employees gain the capacity to, in a sense, hold the firm hostage” (2006, p. 190).  
7 If the employee did not choose an effort level in one of the past three periods because he rejected a contract, the 
principal received this information. In periods 1-3, a principal could only be informed about the effort levels that 
were available so far. 
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employers will be able to observe their current effort choices. Apart from the information given 
to the employers in the screening treatment, the two treatments are identical.  
The screening treatment reflects the fact that employers sometimes have the opportunity 
to receive information about an employee’s past performance before the time of hiring. For 
example, the employer may see letters of reference, he may have talked to a previous employer 
about the employee, or he may have observed the employee directly in his previous position. 
This information, however, is typically incomplete. Even if the employer receives an accurate 
signal about the employee’s previous performance, he does not observe which contract induced 
the observed behavior and how well the employee was treated. This is reflected in our 
experimental design where the employer observes the employee’s actions but not the contracts 
he was offered. Note that the baseline treatment and the screening treatment can be considered as 
treatments with two extreme versions of screening costs. Screening costs are infinite in the 
baseline treatment, rendering any screening unprofitable, while the screening costs are zero in 
the screening treatment because the employers do not have to pay for the information about past 
performance.  
We conducted three sessions of the base treatment and three sessions of the screening 
treatment with 36 participants in each session. We implemented two matching groups in each 
session, so we have six matching groups for each treatment.8 Upon arrival at the lab, half of the 
subjects were randomly and anonymously assigned the role of an employer, the other half the 
role of an employee. The experiment was framed as an employment relationship. We used no 
value laden terms like full or limited discretion, control, trust, or efficiency. We also conducted 
two sessions of a competition treatment, where we implemented, in addition to the screening 
opportunity, competition between employers for employees with a good reputation and between 
employees for employers with attractive job offers. In each session we had 32 participants who 
were divided into two matching groups. The competition treatment is described in more detail in 
Section 4. All experimental instructions are in Section A6 of the supplementary appendix. 
Sessions lasted about 2 hours in the base and screening treatment and 3 hours in the 
competition treatment and took place at the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the 
                                                 
8 With 15 periods and matching groups of 9 employers and 9 employees some of the subjects interacted with the 
same opponent more than once. However, subjects did not know that they were divided in two matching groups, nor 
did they know whether and if so with whom they would interact more than once. Thus, repeated games effects are 
very unlikely. 
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University of Zurich. Subjects were students from the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich. All experiments were computerized with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Payoffs were measured in experimental points that were exchanged into 
Swiss Francs at the end of the experiment. On average, subjects earned about CHF 43 (USD 35 
at the time of the experiments). 
 
3 Behavioral Predictions 
A central question the experiments address is whether there are complementarities between 
different attributes of a job such as the wage level, requested effort, effort discretion, and job 
rents, whether this leads to distinct bundles of job attributes, and if so, which attributes are 
bundled together. In addition, we want to isolate the causal forces that render one or the other 
bundle profit-maximizing and compare them with the bundles the employers actually chose. 
Different behavioral approaches suggest different answers to these questions. 
 
3.1  Self-interest model  
The standard neoclassical approach assumes that all people are fully rational and only interested 
in maximizing their own material payoffs. In this case, the (second best) optimal contract is 
straightforward. In the base treatment, the employee always chooses the effort level that 
minimizes his cost, which is 1e  in a contract with full discretion and 3e  in a contract with 
limited discretion. Furthermore, he accepts all contract offers that yield a non-negative payoff. 
Therefore, the employer offers a wage that holds the employee down to his reservation payoff of 
0. The contract that maximizes the employer’s profit is thus a contract with limited discretion 
and a wage of 3w . This yields profit 4 3 3 9     . Offering a contract with full discretion 
and a wage of 1w only yields a profit of 5 1 1 4     . This prediction holds for both the 
base and the screening treatments. In the last period of the screening treatment, employees have 
no reputation to lose and will thus choose the minimum effort level. Employers anticipate this 
and offer a contract with limited discretion and a wage of 3. By backward induction, this 
outcome is also the unique prediction for all previous periods.9  
                                                 
9 This equilibrium outcome is unique if wages and effort levels are continuous variables. We are grateful to a referee 
for pointing out that a second equilibrium exists in the one-shot game if wages and effort levels are discrete: 
Employers offer contracts with limited discretion and a wage of 4. All employees accept and choose the minimum 
effort level of 3. Wages smaller than 4 are rejected. Even though the two equilibria of the one-shot game are very 
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The self-interest model thus implies that the control strategy prevails in both the base and 
the screening treatment. Employers will always offer a low wage job with limited discretion that 
just covers the effort cost of the requested low effort level, and employees always choose the 
minimal effort level of e = 3.  
 
3.2  Social preferences  
Models of social preferences (e.g., Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher 2006) predict that some employees are “fair” and 
reciprocate high wages with high effort levels, while other employees are mainly self-interested 
(for a survey see, e.g., Sobel 2005 or Fehr and Schmidt 2006). These models also predict that 
controlling an employee does not reduce his effort as long as he is offered a fair wage.10 If the 
employer cannot observe the employee’s past record, her optimal contract offer depends on the 
share of “fair” employees in the population. For example, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model 
predicts that if there are fair employees (who reciprocate high wages with an effort level that 
equalizes payoffs) and “selfish” employees (who always choose the minimal effort level) then 
contracts with limited discretion and low wages are optimal in the base treatment if the fraction 
of fair employees is smaller than 60 percent.11 The model also predicts that contracts with limited 
discretion and wages greater or equal than 7 will be accepted with probability one because they 
give at least half of the surplus to the employee. If less than 44 percent of the employees are fair 
(and reject wages below 7), selfish employers will offer a wage of 3 while fair employers will 
offer a wage of 7.  
How does the possibility of building a reputation affect this prediction? With reputation, 
there exists an efficient equilibrium along the lines of Kreps et al. (1982). In this equilibrium, all 
                                                                                                                                                             
similar and differ only in that the wage is either 3 or 4, they can be used to construct multiple equilibria in the 
screening treatment. For example, the employee can be induced to choose an effort of 4 in the second to last period 
by offering a contract with limited discretion and a wage of 4. On the equilibrium path the employee chooses e=4 
and is rewarded by the continuation equilibrium where the next employer offers a wage of 4 in the last period. If the 
employee deviates and chooses e=3, the continuation equilibrium changes and the next employer will now offer him 
w=3. However, these equilibria require that employers can perfectly coordinate their behaviors. 
10 The reason is that fairness (or kindness) is evaluated only by payoff consequences in all these models. Also in 
models of intention based reciprocity such as Rabin (1993) the fairness of certain actions is evaluated by the payoff 
actually given to the other player relative to the set of feasible payoffs that could have been given to the other player. 
Thus, if the wage is fair, controlling the employee has no impact on the perceived fairness of the situation. 
11 In Section A1 of the supplementary appendix we show that in the base treatment about 70 percent of our subjects 
can be classified as selfish and 30 percent as fair. This is well below the required threshold of 60 percent. In Section 
A2 we derive the optimal contract and the predicted behavior of employers and employees as a function of the 
fraction of fair subjects in a simple model with inequity aversion. 
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employers offer employees with a high reputation generous contracts with full discretion in all 
but the last few periods, and contracts with limited discretion and low wages to those with a low 
reputation. Fair employees with a high reputation (or, in period 1, with no reputation yet) accept 
generous contracts with full discretion and work hard in all periods. They reject contracts with 
limited discretion and those with full discretion combined with low wages. Selfish employees 
mimic fair employees in all but the last few periods where they start to randomize between 
spending a high effort of 10 and a low effort of 1. Once they have lost their good reputations, 
selfish employees shirk forever.12 
To summarize, the model of inequity aversion predicts that employers in the base treatment 
predominantly implement the control strategy, i.e., that they offer contracts with limited 
discretion and low wages, which induces employees to choose an effort level close to 3e . In 
the screening treatment, employers will condition their job offers on the available signals about 
past performance. They use the trust strategy for employees with a high signal, i.e., offering 
contracts with full discretion and high wages, while they use the control strategy for employees 
with a low signal, i.e., providing contracts with limited discretion and low wages. The resulting 
incentive for reputation formation will induce employees to choose higher effort levels than in 
the base treatment. The joint effect of high performance signals and the conditioning of good job 
offers on high performance signals are predicted to lead to a prevalence of the trust strategy in 
the screening treatment.  
 
3.3  Hidden costs of control  
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) and Falk and Kosfeld (2006) show experimentally that controlling 
agents may crowd out voluntary effort provision. Falk and Kosfeld (2006) called this the “hidden 
costs of control,” and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) provide a formal model that rationalizes 
this behavioral pattern. In our set-up, hidden costs of control would arise if fair employees, who 
are willing to provide effort above the minimally enforceable level if they are offered high wages 
and full discretion, reduce their voluntary effort provision if they are controlled. However, there 
                                                 
12 This equilibrium is, of course, only one of many possible equilibria in the screening treatment. The multiplicity of 
equilibria is a typical feature of games in which reputation matters; it renders unique predictions impossible. 
However, this is the most efficient equilibrium, and the beliefs and behaviors associated with it seem plausible; they 
are based on the intuition that employers benefit from the screening opportunity by conditioning their job offers on 
the available performance signal, which then generates reputational incentives for the employees to provide high 
effort levels in response to generous job offers. Therefore, we use this equilibrium as a heuristic tool for the 
generation of behavioral conjectures. 
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are two additional effects of a limited discretion contract that point in the opposite direction. 
First, limiting discretion reduces the shirking of selfish employees who are forced to work 
harder. Second, limiting discretion reduces the efficiency parameter from b=5 to b=4, which 
may increase effort if some employees are inequity averse. The Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model 
predicts that for any given wage an inequality averse employee will react to limited discretion 
with a weakly higher effort level to compensate for the lower efficiency of effort.13 These two 
latter effects may outweigh the hidden cost of control effect. However, if – conditional on wages 
– the average effort under limited discretion contracts is strictly smaller than under full discretion 
contracts, then we can unambiguously conclude that hidden costs of control exist. Furthermore, 
if these costs are sufficiently high, they may render full discretion contracts more profitable than 
limited discretion contracts even in the base treatment where the employers have no information 
about their employees.  
 
4 Results 
In Section 4.1, we discuss the employers’ job strategies, i.e., their clustering of job attributes. 
Section 4.2 analyzes the optimality of these clusters in the different treatments. In Section 4.3, 
we explain the pattern of profit-maximizing clusters of job attributes in terms of employees’ 
effort behavior and discuss whether hidden costs of control affect this pattern. Section 4.4 
examines whether employers offer the optimal clusters of job characteristics in the different 
treatments and how the deviations from optimality are associated with labor market 
segmentation. In Section 4.5, we study the impact of labor market competition on the employers’ 
job strategies, the employees’ effort choices, market segmentation, and overall surplus.  
 
4.1  Dichotomy of Job Design 
Our experimental design allows for a large number of combinations between full and limited 
discretion, wages, requested effort levels, and offered shares of the surplus. However, we 
observe predominantly two very distinct clusters of job characteristics: 
 
Result 1 (dichotomy of job design): The employers rely predominantly on two 
fundamentally distinct strategies in both the base and the screening treatment, i.e., 
                                                 
13 An inequality averse employee chooses e to equalize payoffs, i.e., w-c(e)=be-w which implies e(w)=2w/(b+1). 
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they offer two types of jobs that differ in all dimensions. They offer either a job with 
full discretion, high wages, a high requested effort level, and a high share of the 
surplus for the employee (trust strategy), or they offer a job with limited discretion, 
low wages, a low requested effort level, and a low share (control strategy). 
 























FIGURE 1.—Dichotomy of Job Design. 
 
Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1, which shows average wages, average requested 
effort levels, and the average offered share of the surplus for both treatments. The offered share 
of the surplus is defined as min{w – c( e~ )/b e~  – c( e~ ),1}, i.e., it is determined by the wage ݓ 
and the requested effort level ݁̃. The figure shows the same clustering of job characteristics for 
both treatments. For example, if the employer offers a job with full discretion, average wages are 
higher than 20 in both treatments, while average wages are below 10 for job offers with limited 
discretion. Likewise, the average requested effort level is roughly ݁̃ ൌ 8 in case of a job with full 
discretion, while the employer only asks for approximately ݁̃ ൌ 5 under limited discretion. 
Finally, the employees are offered about 40 percent of the surplus in jobs with full discretion but 
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across full and limited discretion jobs are highly significant (two-sided t-tests,14 controlling for 
individual fixed effects and clustering on employers, p≤0.001 for each of the six tests implicit in 
Figure 1).15 Result 1 suggests that job offers with full discretion are based on a trust strategy that 
attempts to appeal to the employees’ fairness by offering a generous share of the surplus, while 
jobs offering limited discretion implement a control strategy that limits the employee’s shirking 
opportunities and the losses the employer can incur.  
 
4.2  Profitability of Different Clusters of Job Attributes 
Result 1 raises the question which strategy is more profitable. The next result provides this 
information.  
 
Result 2 (optimality of different clusters): The control strategy is optimal for the 
employer in the base treatment even though limiting discretion reduces efficiency. 
In the screening treatment it is optimal to condition on the employee’s track record. 
If the employee has a medium or high reputation the trust strategy is optimal, while 
the control strategy is better if the employee has a low reputation.  
 
An employee is assigned to the low reputation category if his average effort in the previous three 
periods, denoted by r, is below 3.5; he has a medium reputation if 3.5≤r<6.5, and a high 
reputation if r6.5.16 The upper panel of Figure 2 provides support for Result 2. In the base 
treatment, employers who offer contracts with limited discretion and low wages (w<10) earn 
significantly more than employers offering jobs with full discretion and low wages (t-test, 
p≤0.001) and employers offering contracts with limited discretion and medium wages 
(10≤w<20; t-test, p≤0.001). In fact, employers who offer full discretion contracts incur losses on 
average. In the screening treatment the profit pattern in case of low reputation employees is 
remarkably similar to the base treatment. Again, offering a contract with limited discretion and 
low wages is significantly better than full discretion and low wages or limited discretion and 
medium wages (t-tests, p≤0.001). Thus, in the base treatment and in the screening treatment with 
                                                 
14 All tests reported in this paper are two-sided. 
15 The observed differences in job characteristics are not only perceived at the level of averages. See Section A3 of 
the supplementary appendix for more detailed information. In Section A4 of the supplementary appendix we also 
show that the clustering is stable over time. 
16 In the first period, an employee has no reputation and the reputation index is not defined. In the second and third 
period, the reputation index r uses the information of only one and two periods, respectively. If a contract was 
rejected in a period, this period was not considered for the computation of r.  
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low reputation employees, employers’ profits are highest when they offer contracts with limited 
discretion and pay low wages. This contrasts sharply with the screening treatment with medium 
and high reputation employees where profits are highest when contracts with full discretion and 
high wages (w≥20) are offered. If employers pay high wages, their profits are significantly 
higher if they offer a job with full rather than a job with limited discretion; and given a full 
discretion job offer, paying high wages is more profitable than paying medium wages (t-tests, 
p≤0.001). Note that in all cases either the trust or the control strategy maximizes profits; there is 
no situation in which some other possible job design (e.g., full discretion combined with low 
wage offers) is optimal. Tables 1 and 2 below provide regression analyses of employers’ profits 
in the base and the screening treatment confirming the results on optimal contract choices. 
 
4.3  Employees’ Effort Choices 
Result 2 raises the question why the control strategy is optimal in the base treatment and in the 
screening treatment with low reputation employees, while the trust strategy is optimal in the 
screening treatment when employees have a medium or high reputation. Since the profit pattern 
is shaped by the employees’ effort choices, we examine the employees’ behavior next.  
 
Result 3a (employees’ effort responses in the base treatment): The employees respond 
to higher wages with higher average effort levels in the base treatment, but the 
slope of the wage-effort relation is too small to render a high wage strategy 
profitable. In addition, employees provide considerably higher effort at low wages 
when they are offered a job with limited discretion than when they have full 
discretion. This renders the control strategy optimal.  
 
Support for Result 3a is provided by the corresponding graphs in Figure 2 and the regressions in 
Table 1. The left bottom graph of Figure 2 shows that in the base treatment higher wages are 
reciprocated with higher average effort levels both for jobs with limited and jobs with full 
discretion. However, the effect is too small to render a high wage strategy optimal, which can be 
seen in the corresponding profit graph. Moreover, at low wages, effort is much higher in jobs 
with limited than in jobs with full discretion, which renders – despite the efficiency loss of 
limiting discretion – the control strategy optimal.  
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FIGURE 2.—Optimal Job Offers and Wage-Effort Relation.17 
 
The regressions in Table 1 confirm these findings. In effort regression (1), the wage coefficient 
for a full discretion job, which is the omitted category in the regression, is about 0.2. As the 
productivity of effort is b=5, this coefficient implies that a wage increase of 10 raises effort by 
roughly 2, which in turn increase revenue by 5×2=10, implying a flat wage-profit relation for 
jobs with full discretion. This is confirmed by the profit regression (3), where the wage 
coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. Since the interaction between the dummy for 
limited discretion (“limited”) and wage is significantly negative in the effort regression, the wage 
coefficient for jobs with limited discretion is lower and amounts to about 0.14. A wage increase 
of 10 thus only increases effort by 1.4, which – in combination with the lower effort productivity 
of b=4 – increases revenue only by 4×1.4=5.6, implying that the wage-profit relation is negative. 
This is also confirmed by the profit regression (3), where the corresponding coefficient is 
negative and significant. Moreover, the “limited” dummy is significantly positive in the effort 
                                                 
17 The average effort is computed for accepted contracts only, the average profit for all contracts. Rejection rates are 
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regression, indicating that at low wage levels effort is higher in jobs with limited than in jobs 
with full discretion. This effort advantage at low wage levels reflects the fact that employees 
must at least provide an effort of 3 under limited discretion. The large and highly significant 
coefficient of “limited” in the profit regression (3) indicates that the higher effort levels outweigh 
the lower efficiency of these jobs. The reason is that reducing the efficiency of effort is relatively 
inexpensive if employees choose low effort levels. The effort regression (2) finally shows that 
controlling for requested effort and for period effects does not affect the results.18 
 
Table 1—Determinants of Effort and Employers’ Profits in Base Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) 
































observations 658 658 810 
adj. R2 0.474 0.470 0.063 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The effort regressions cluster by employees, control for individual fixed effects, and 
consider only accepted contracts as no effort is chosen if a contract is rejected. All contracts are 
included in regression (3) to capture the effect of rejections on profits. In regression (2), only the 
period dummies 3 and 7 are significant at the 10 and 5 percent level, respectively, i.e., there is no 
time trend or end game effect. The profit regression (3) is robust to the inclusion of the full set of 
set of period dummies, too (not shown here). 
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
 
                                                 
18 Figure 2 and Table 1 raise the question whether employers’ expected profits with limited discretion contracts are 
maximized by offering the lowest possible wage or whether they should leave some rent to employees. A closer look 
at the low wage interval (w<10) reveals that holding employees down to their reservation utilities is not optimal 
because such offers are rejected with a very high probability. In particular, wages of 3, 4, 5 and 6 are rejected in 88, 
84, 39 and 30 percent of the cases, respectively, while offers of 7 are only rejected in 13 percent of the cases. Job 
offers with higher wages are almost never rejected. Offering wages below 7 is thus not optimal. 
  19
Taken together, the data indicate that in the base treatment, a high wage strategy is not profitable. 
In addition, the effect that employees are forced to provide more effort under limited discretion 
outweighs the productivity disadvantage of limited discretion, thus rendering a control strategy 
optimal. The next result shows how the employees’ effort choices in the screening treatment 
change this pattern.  
 
Result 3b (employees’ effort responses in the screening treatment):  
(i)  In the screening treatment, the effort responses of the employees with a low 
reputation are very similar to their responses in the base treatment, which renders 
the control strategy optimal. 
(ii)  The wage-effort relation for employees with a medium or high reputation is 
steep enough to render the payment of high wages profitable. Moreover, the higher 
efficiency of full discretion is particularly advantageous at high effort levels, 
rendering the trust strategy optimal.  
 
This result is supported by the corresponding graphs in Figure 2 and the regressions in Table 2. 
A first salient characteristic of the effort pattern of low reputation employees is that it very 
closely resembles that in the base treatment (compare the left and the middle bottom graph of 
Figure 2). Low reputation employees in the screening treatment act as if there were no 
reputational incentives. Thus, as in the base treatment, the control strategy is optimal, which can 
be seen in the corresponding profit graph. The right bottom graph of Figure 2 shows that 
employees with a medium or high reputation display a much steeper wage-effort relation than 
those with a low reputation. The corresponding profit graph reveals that the steeper wage-effort 
relation translates into a positive wage-profit relation, especially under more efficient full 
discretion jobs. This renders the trust strategy optimal. 
The regressions in Table 2 confirm these findings. While the effort regressions (1) and (2) 
display a relatively large coefficient for “wage”, regressions (3) – (5) show that the size of the 
wage coefficient decreases considerably if we control for the employees’ reputations and the 
interaction between reputation, wage, and limited discretion.19 Note that the omitted category in 
                                                 
19 “Medium-reputation” and “high-reputation” are dummy variables that take on value 1 if r is in [3.5,6.5) or 
[6.5,10], respectively. These dummies are functions of past effort choices; hence the strict exogeneity assumption 
that ensures the consistency of fixed effects estimators is violated. However, the bias in fixed effects models with a 
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regressions (3) – (6) is a job with full discretion offered to a low reputation employee, meaning 
that the wage coefficient in these regressions captures the wage-effort relation for exactly these 
employees. The wage coefficient in the effort regressions is about 0.2 in these cases, which is 
very similar to the base treatment, implying a flat wage-profit relation. This is confirmed in the 
profit regression (6). Moreover, the regressions reveal that the interactions between limited 
discretion and wages are significantly negative, while the “limited” dummy has a large and 
highly significant coefficient. Thus, as in the base treatment, the employers can earn the highest 
profits if they use the control strategy whenever they face an employee with a low reputation.20 
Turning to medium and high reputation employees, regression (2) shows that these 
employees do not provide a higher effort level per se; the coefficient on medium and high 
reputation is small and insignificant in this regression. Rather, these employees tend to supply 
the same low effort level as low reputation employees if offered a low wage, but they provide 
much higher effort levels if offered a high wage. This fact is revealed by regression (3), which 
shows that the medium and high reputation employees display a smaller intercept (the coefficient 
on medium and high reputation is significantly negative) and a larger slope in the wage-effort 
space than the low reputation employees (the interaction between wage and reputation is 
significantly positive). The slope effect, in particular, is large and quantitatively important 
because it generates an incentive for the employers to pay high wages to these employees, 
especially if discretion is not limited. The profit regression (6) corroborates these findings and 
indicates that the effort behavior of medium and high reputation employees causes a sizeable 
efficiency wage effect that renders – in combination with the higher efficiency of granting full 
discretion – the trust strategy optimal. The regressions also reveal that there is a large and highly 
significant last period effect. In the final period there is no longer a reputational incentive which 
lowers effort and thus profits. Finally, regressions (4) and (5) show that including interactions 
between reputation and limited discretion, controlling for requested effort, and including 
dummies for all non-final periods does not affect the results.  
                                                                                                                                                             
lagged dependent variable is of order 1/T (see Hsiao, 2003, section 8.1). In our experiments we have T=15, so the 
bias should be rather small.  
20 Similar to the base treatment, one may ask which wage in the low wage interval maximizes the employers’ profits 
under limited discretion. Rejection rates for wages offers of 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are 100, 59, 46, 39 and 4 percent, 
respectively, while wages above 7 are almost never rejected. Offering wages below 7 is thus again not optimal. 
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Table 2—Determinants of Effort and Employers’ Profits in Screening Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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observations 711 655 655 655 655 745 
adj. R2 0.649 0.661 0.676 0.675 0.671 0.301 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Effort regressions cluster by employees, control for individual fixed effects, and consider only accepted contracts 
as no effort is chosen if a contract is rejected. All contracts are included in the regression (6) to capture the effect 
of rejections on profits. Regressions (2)-(6) consider observations with at least one previous effort choice only as 
an employee’s reputation cannot be classified otherwise. All non-final period dummies in regression (5) are 
insignificant. The profit regression (6) is robust to the inclusion of the full set of period dummies, too (not shown 
here).  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent.  
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Taken together, the evidence unambiguously shows that conditioning the job offer on the 
employees’ reputation is profit maximizing. Employers can elicit high effort in highly productive 
jobs with a limited risk of shirking if they offer high wages and full discretion only to employees 
with a medium or high reputation. In contrast, employees with a low reputation should receive 
only a low wage and be forced to provide at least an effort level of 3. 
In Section 3 we discussed the predictions of the self-interest model and models of social 
preferences. The prevalence of bad jobs in the base treatment is consistent with both the self-
interest model and models of social preferences but pure self-interest alone cannot explain the 
results of the screening treatment. However, if there are some fair employees who are willing to 
reciprocate high wages with high effort, then selfish employees have an incentive to mimic this 
behavior and to build up a reputation for being fair in order to get better job offers in the future. 
It is this reputation building of strategic employees that renders the trust strategy profitable.   
We also discussed the potential role of hidden costs of control in Section 3. If – 
conditional on wages – average effort is strictly lower under limited discretion than under full 
discretion, then there is unambiguous evidence for hidden costs of control. Figure 2 shows, 
however, that effort under limited discretion is not lower than effort under full discretion – 
except for medium and high reputation employees in the screening treatment who receive high 
wages. This effort difference is, however, explained by the higher average wage under contracts 
with full discretion within this wage interval.21 Thus, our results do not unambiguously confirm 
the existence of hidden costs of control, but they do not rule out their existence either. It is 
possible that some subjects reduce effort under limited discretion while other agents increase 
effort, either because they are forced to do so by the higher minimum effort level or because they 
are inequity averse and spend more effort to compensate for the lower effort productivity. These 
effects could cancel each other out.22 However, the data do show that in our setting hidden costs 
                                                 
21 The average wage is 25.3 under full and 21.4 under limited discretion. The highest wage under limited discretion 
is 27. If we consider only the interval	ݓ ∈ ሾ20,27ሿ, then the average wage under full discretion falls to 22.2 and the 
average effort to 7.1. This is close to the average effort of 6.9 under limited discretion and not significantly different 
(t-test, controlling for individual fixed effects and clustering on employees, p=0.487). In the other two high wage 
cases (base treatment and screening treatment with low reputation agents) the average wage is also not higher under 
limited discretion. Hence, differences in average wages cannot explain the identical average effort levels in these 
cases. 
22 In regression (4) of Table 2, we also investigate whether employees with a good reputation reacted differently to 
being controlled than low reputation employees. Employees with a good reputation might react especially averse to 
limited discretion. However, the coefficients of the interactions between medium and high reputation and “limited” 
are both small and insignificant. 
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of control are not sufficiently large to render job offers with full discretion optimal, neither in the 
base treatment nor for low reputation employees in the screening treatment. Moreover, in our 
setting, hidden costs of control are not a necessary prerequisite for the optimality of job offers 
with full discretion for medium and high reputation employees.23  
 
4.4  Actual Job Offers, Labor Market Segmentation, and Total Surplus 
The previous results show the conditions under which either the trust or the control strategy is 
profit maximizing, and also the reasons for the respective optimal job design. But we have not 
yet reported whether the employers choose their employment strategies optimally. The next 
result addresses this question. 
 
Result 4 (employers’ actual job offers):  
(a)  In the base treatment, the large majority of employers converge towards 
optimal behavior and implement the control strategy.  
(b)  In the screening treatment, employers behave optimally in the majority of cases 
and condition their strategy on the employees’ reputation, i.e., if they face low 
reputation employees, they use the control strategy in the large majority of cases, 
while they utilize the trust strategy in more than half of the cases if they face 
medium or high reputation employees. 
 
To support Result 4, we report the relative frequency of job offers with full discretion in the 
different conditions. We know from Result 1 that a job with full discretion is associated with the 
trust strategy, while a job with limited discretion is associated with the control strategy. Figure 3 
shows the share of full discretion job offers over time.  
 
                                                 
23 To see this, consider the relevant wage interval (20≤w) for medium and high reputation employees. In this 
interval, the average effort for jobs with full discretion is about 8, yielding revenue of about 5×8=40. Now consider 
jobs with limited discretion and assume that hidden costs of control are completely absent. This implies that average 
effort increases because none of the employees reduces his effort relative to the full discretion case. Assume further, 
for the sake of the argument, that limiting discretion increases every employee’s effort by 2 (minimum effort 
increases from 1 to 3). Average effort would then be 10, yielding revenue of 4×10=40, which just matches revenue 
under full discretion. Clearly, limiting discretion would raise average effort by less than 2 because with an average 
effort of 8, only some agents can choose an effort below the threshold of e=3; there might, however, be a small 
positive effect of inequity aversion on effort. Limited discretion jobs would thus still not be more profitable than full 
discretion jobs, even under the complete absence of hidden costs. Hence, these costs are not a necessary prerequisite 
for the optimality of full discretion jobs in our experimental setting. 
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FIGURE 3.—Share of Full Discretion Contract Offers over Time. 
 
In the base treatment, the share of contract offers with full discretion starts out at 50 percent, but 
falls to less than 20 percent over time, indicating that many employers experimented with the 
trust strategy but learnt over time that this strategy is not profitable. Figure 3 shows that a very 
similar picture emerges in the screening treatment if employers face low reputation employees. 
However, employers offer full discretion contracts much more frequently to employees with a 
medium or high reputation. The overall share of job offers with full discretion is 55 percent for 
these employees and it falls below 50 percent only in the last two periods. According to a Fisher 
exact test, the share of full discretion job offers is significantly higher for medium and high 
reputation employees compared to low reputation employees (p≤0.001), and compared to the 
base treatment (p≤0.001).  
Although employees with a medium or high reputation face the trust strategy in the 
majority of cases, they are also offered non-optimal contracts with limited discretion in 45 









































Result 5 (suboptimal behavior and labor market segmentation):  
(a)  The frequency of optimal behavior is higher in the base treatment than in the 
screening treatment because a significant minority of employers do not condition 
their job offer on the employees’ reputation but always follow the control strategy.  
(b)  A significant share of narrowly self-interested employees do not reciprocate 
high wages with high effort in the screening treatment, implying that they are 
permanently stuck with “bad” jobs with limited discretion.  
 
Result 5a is supported by the fact that almost 17 percent of employers (9 out of 54) always opt 
for the control strategy in the screening treatment and another 4 percent (2 out of 54) choose the 
trust strategy only once.24 These non-responsive employers may have had very pessimistic 
beliefs about their employees’ effort choices or they may have been highly risk or betrayal 
averse. Since they do not condition their strategy on employees’ reputation, their average profits 
are 42 percent lower than the profits of employers who respond to their employees’ past behavior 
– a difference that is highly significant (t-test, clustering on employers, p≤0.001). 
Employers who never trust and always implement the control strategy induce employees 
who would have worked hard for a generous wage to provide low effort. Furthermore, the 
incentives for employees to acquire a good reputation are diminished since not all the employers 
condition their job offers on reputation. However, acquiring a good reputation remains 
profitable: employees with a high reputation earn on average 82 percent more than employees 
with a low reputation and 25 percent more than employees with a medium reputation (t-tests, 
clustering on employees, p≤0.001). Support for Result 5b is provided in Section A1 of the 
supplementary appendix we show that about 20 percent of the employees did not reciprocate to 
high wages in the screening treatment even though this would have been profitable, i.e., these 
employees can be characterized as “narrowly self-interested.”  
Result 5 explains why a substantial fraction of both good and bad jobs co-exist in the 
screening treatment. This finding is reminiscent of the literature on dual labor markets, which 
provides a stylized description of actual labor markets in terms of a primary and a secondary 
market (e.g., Doeringer and Piore 1971). In the primary market, employees enjoy higher wages 
                                                 
24 A closer look at the data shows the non-responsive employers did not face a worse distribution of employees than 
the responsive employers: the non-responsive employers faced on average employees with a reputation index of 
5.25, while the responsive employers faced on average employees with an index of 5.23. 
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and job security, while low wages, high turnover, and low job security prevail in the secondary 
sector. Bulow and Summers (1986) and Saint-Paul (1997) explain the existence of dual labor 
markets with efficiency wage theories based on differences in monitoring costs or employment 
adjustment costs across the two sectors. In these models, technological factors are the source of 
dual labor markets. In our experiment, however, there are no technological differences. Our 
findings suggest that individual characteristics of employers and employees (their willingness to 
trust and to behave trustworthily) may also contribute to the segmentation of the labor market.  
Despite the existence of a substantial minority of employers and employees behaving 
sup-optimally the screening treatment provides incentives to spend high effort and to offer jobs 
with full discretion. Therefore, total surplus is positively affected by the screening opportunity, 
which is stated as the next result.  
 
Result 6 (screening and total surplus): The screening opportunity causes a strong 
increase in total surplus, which is primarily reaped by the employers.  
 
The impact of the screening treatment on the employers’ and employees’ average income can be 
inferred from Figure 4. The figure shows that both employers and employees benefit on average 
from the screening opportunities. For the employers, the increase in average per period income is 
highly significant (rank-sum test on matching group averages, p=0.004; recall that both in the 
base and in the screening treatment we have six matching groups), while the null hypothesis of 
equal incomes across treatments cannot be rejected for the employees (rank-sum test on 
matching group averages, p=0.200). Overall, the total average per period surplus is 58 percent 
higher in the screening treatment – a difference that is highly significant (rank-sum test on 
matching group averages, p=0.007). This increase in the total surplus has two main sources – the 
higher share of jobs with full discretion and the higher average effort of the employees. In fact, 
in accepted contracts we observe a significant increase in average effort from 3.70 in the base 
treatment to 5.10 in the screening treatment (rank-sum test on matching group averages, 
p=0.004).25  
 
                                                 
25 Moreover, the fraction of accepted contracts is slightly higher in the screening treatment than in the base treatment 
(0.88 vs. 0.81; rank-sum test on matching group averages, p=0.077). 
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FIGURE 4.—Employers’ profits, employees’ incomes, and surplus in the different treatments. 
 
The effort increase represents the joint effect of employers’ and employees’ behavior in the 
screening treatment. Since the majority of employers condition their strategy on the performance 
signals, the employees have an incentive to provide high effort in response to high wages. And 
since a good reputation is a reliable signal for the willingness to reciprocate generous wages with 
high effort, the employers need not fear shirking if they pay high wages and offer full discretion 
jobs. Thus, the actions of the responsive employers and the reciprocating employees mutually 
reinforce each other and lead to the provision of higher effort levels and a majority of jobs with 
full discretion, which both increases total surplus. 
 
4.5  Labor Market Competition 
Our screening treatment identifies the causal impact of screening opportunities in a bilateral 
bargaining environment. In most labor markets, competition and screening interact in intricate 
ways. Since they almost always exist simultaneously it is difficult to identify how competition 
shapes the employers’ screening activities and employees’ reputation formation behavior in field 
data. Our laboratory setting enables us to study this question cleanly by conducting an additional 
treatment that introduces competition among the employees for good job offers and among 
employers for good employees. The competition treatment also allows us to answer the question 
whether competition renders the control strategy or the trust strategy more efficient.  
Our competition treatment has the following features. At the beginning of each of the 15 


























are matched. Each employer observes all four employees' performance signals, and then must 
make a contract offer to each of the four employees. Since an employer can only employ one 
employee, the employers also specify the order in which the four employees receive their 
respective offers. There are four matching rounds in every period in order to match employers to 
employees. In the first round, each employer’s most preferred employee receives the offer, 
meaning that any one employee might receive several offers (up to four), just one offer, or none. 
The employees who received offers in this round then decide whether to accept any of these 
offers, but nobody may accept more than one. Employers whose offers are rejected and 
employees who did not receive or accept an offer enter the second round. In this round, the 
remaining employers’ second preferred employees receive an offer. This process continues in 
rounds 3 and 4.26  
As in the previous treatments, employees do not observe the offers received by the other 
employees. However, an employee may have to wait until the second, third, or even fourth round 
before getting his first offer, from which he may conclude that he is no employers’ first choice. 
Similarly, as in the previous treatments, employers do not observe the contract offers other 
employers make. However, if an employer’s offers are frequently not accepted during the early 
matching rounds, he may conclude that other employers offered more attractive contracts. Both 
effects foster learning. Note that this learning opportunity captures a feature of most labor 
markets in the field because employees with a low reputation presumably also have more 
difficulties finding a job in these markets, and employers who offer less attractive jobs have to 
wait longer to fill their vacancies.  
We showed in Section 4.1 that the employers offer two very distinct bundles of job 
characteristics both in the base and in the screening treatment. The same dichotomy of job 
characteristics prevails in the competition treatment. Contract offers with full discretion are 
associated with much higher wages (24.7 vs. 12.8), higher requested effort levels (9.4 vs. 6.8), 
and significantly higher shares of the surplus (0.40 vs. 0.31). The differences in job 
characteristics across contracts with full and limited discretion are highly significant in all three 
dimensions (t-tests, controlling for individual fixed effects and clustering on employers, 
p≤0.002). The bundling of distinct job characteristics into good and bad jobs is thus a robust 
                                                 
26 We introduced competition only in the screening treatment and not in the base treatment because competition 
cannot make any difference in the latter. All employees look identical without performance signals, and employers 
cannot discriminate between them. 
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phenomenon that occurs under all treatment conditions. In addition, the profit maximizing job 
design is as in the screening treatment. In accepted contracts, for low reputation employees, low 
wages and limited discretion are optimal, while for medium and high reputation employees 
profits are maximized by offering high wages and full discretion. 
To what extent do the employers choose the optimal strategy in the competition 
treatment? Result 7a shows that this is done to a much larger degree than in the screening 
treatment. 
 
Result 7 (competition substantially increases the share of good jobs):  
(a)  In the competition treatment, almost all high reputation employees receive 
“good” job offers and almost all low reputation employees get “bad” job offers.  
(b)  The large majority of employees works hard and acquires a high reputation.  
 
Result 7a is supported by the left graph of Figure 5, which illustrates the share of job offers with 
full discretion for employees with different reputations in the screening and the competition 
treatments.27 The higher an employee’s reputation in the screening treatment, the more often he 
receives a job offer with full discretion (in 21, 52, and 59 percent of the cases, respectively). The 
competition treatment strongly reinforces this pattern. Employees with a high reputation are now 
considerably more likely to receive offers with full discretion (in 79 percent of the cases), while 
employees with a low or medium reputation receive fewer such offers than in the screening 
treatment (only in 8 percent and 27 percent of the cases, respectively).28 The treatment 
differences in the share of full discretion contracts are highly significant for medium and high 
reputation agents (Fisher exact-test, p≤0.001) but not for low reputation agents (p=0.180).29 One 
reason for the higher frequency of good job offers for high reputation employees in the 
competition treatment is that the acceptance probability more than doubles when a contract with 
full discretion instead of a contract with limited discretion is offered to a high reputation 
                                                 
27 In the competition treatment, we consider only offers that employees actually received because this accounts for 
the order in which employers made their offers to the employees. If an employer had a match in an early matching 
round, his contract offers for the remaining matching rounds are not taken into account. Similarly, if an employee 
accepted an offer in an early matching round, the offers that he might have received in later matching rounds are 
also not taken into account.  
28 Section A4 of the supplementary appendix further shows that the pattern of contract offers in the competition 
treatment is stable over time. 
29 There are only few observations with low reputation agents in the competition treatment; only 2 out of 23 such 
employees received a job offer with full discretion.  
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employee, while in the screening treatment this increase is only 34 percent. A rank-sum test on 
the probability increase in matching groups shows that the difference is significant (p=0.055; 
recall that we have only four matching groups in the competition treatment). Competition thus 
increases the employers’ incentives to offer full discretion rather than limited discretion jobs to 
attract high reputation employees. Moreover, given an offer is accepted, in the competition 
treatment employers realize 27 percent higher profits with full discretion contracts and high 
reputation employees compared to the screening treatment (rank-sum test on matching group 
averages, p=0.019).  
 
Screening by Employers Reputation and Income 
FIGURE 5.—Employers’ sorting behavior across the reputation and competition treatment (left 
graph) and the consequences for employees’ incentives for reputation formation (right graph). 
 
The stronger dependence of job offers on employees’ reputations has important consequences for 
the employees’ incentives to build a good reputation. Since jobs with full discretion are 
associated with higher rents, the employees in the competition treatment have a stronger 
incentive to acquire a good reputation. This effect is indicated in the right graph of Figure 5, 
which depicts the employees’ average per period income as a function of their reputation. The 
graph mimics the qualitative pattern of the left graph because the increase in income from 
building a high instead of just a medium or a low reputation is much larger in the competition 
treatment than in the screening treatment. The treatment differences in employees’ incomes are 
significant in each of the three reputation classes (t-tests, p=0.036, p=0.017, and p≤0.001 for low, 



























































Did the employees’ respond to these stronger incentives by acquiring higher reputation 
levels? Result 7b shows that this is indeed the case. The average reputation of an employee is 
5.24 in the screening treatment and 8.31 in the competition treatment (t-test; p≤0.001) For 
example, more than 80 percent of the employees (26 out of 32) in the competition treatment have 
on average a reputation index exceeding r=6.5 (“high reputation”), while only 30 percent of the 
employees (16 out of 54) in the screening treatment acquire on average a high reputation 
(Fisher exact-test; p≤0.001). In addition, only one of the 32 employees in the competition 
treatment displays on average a low average reputation (i.e., r<3.5) while about a quarter of the 
employees (13 out of 54) in the screening treatment fall into this category (Fisher exact-test; 
p=0.014).  
The above results show that labor market competition increases the employers’ incentives 
to offer full discretion contracts to high reputation employees, which in turn strengthens the 
employees’ incentives to acquire a high reputation. Therefore, the competition treatment induces 
employers to rely more on the trust strategy and employees to behave more trustworthily. This 
largely reduces the secondary sector of the labor market. With regard to the provision of good 
jobs, screening and competition can therefore be viewed as complements: competition reinforces 
the incentives for screening, which ultimately causes a much higher share of good jobs.  
When competition is added to the screening opportunities, the overall share of jobs with 
full discretion increases to 77 percent relative to the 51 percent in the screening treatment; in 
periods 10-14, when reputation incentives still exist and subjects had time to learn the 
mechanisms of reputation formation under competitive conditions, this share even reaches 82 
percent compared to 49 percent in the screening treatment. These treatment differences are 
highly significant (Fisher exact-tests; p≤0.001) and led to a substantial increase in welfare.  
 
Result 8 (competition and total surplus): The introduction of competition in addition to 
screening causes a substantial increase in total surplus. Both sides of the market, 
employers and employees, significantly benefit from competition. 
 
Evidence for the last result comes from Figure 4. Both the employers’ average profit and the 
employees’ average income per period are higher in each of the four matching groups of the 
competition treatment than in all six matching groups of the screening treatment (rank-sum tests 
on matching group averages yield p=0.011). Overall, the total per period surplus is 72 percent 
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higher in the competition treatment than in screening treatment and 172 percent higher than in 
the base treatment. The increase in total surplus is also driven by a significant increase in average 
effort in accepted contracts, which amounts to 8.02 in the competition treatment. The differences 
to the base (3.70) and the screening treatment (5.10) are again significant (rank-sum tests on 
matching group averages, p=0.011). 
 
5 Discussion 
There is a large empirical literature in industrial relations and personnel economics documenting 
the prevalence and profitability of HPWS in many industries (e.g., Osterman 1994; Ichniowski 
and Shaw 2003; Lazear and Oyer 2010). This literature identifies empirical characteristics of 
HPWS, of the firms that are using them, and of the industries they are operating in. However, it 
is still not fully understood why and under what conditions HPWS are viable. Why are HPWS 
more common in some industries than in others? Why do HPWS and more traditional forms of 
workplace organization sometimes coexist in the same industry? The empirical literature shows 
that certain workplace and industry or firm characteristics are highly correlated. However, with 
field data it is difficult to show the causal links between these factors.  
The most important contribution of our experimental analysis is the identification of 
causal determinants of good jobs that pay high wages and provide full effort discretion. By 
exogenously changing the screening opportunities of firms and the degree of labor market 
competition and by assigning subjects randomly to the different treatment conditions we can 
show that these factors cause the emergence of good jobs. In addition, our data allow us to 
explicitly identify the complementarities between screening, efficiency wages, and effort 
discretion as the pathway through which the screening opportunity and labor market competition 
exert their causal effects. This sheds new light on the fundamental questions raised above. In this 
section we relate our experimental results to the existing empirical evidence on HPWS, pointing 
out the new insights that we obtain, but also the limitations of our analysis. 
Our analysis shows that screening, efficiency wages, and effort discretion are positively 
correlated because they are complements. Figure 2 shows that there are two local profit maxima 
in the space of job characteristics. It is a local profit maximum if firms pay low wages (w<10), 
limit discretion, and do not screen workers. Given that wages are low, profits are substantially 
higher with limited discretion than with full discretion, a fact that holds for all types of 
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employees regardless of their reputation levels. Since all employees behave similarly under low 
wages, screening workers provides no benefits. If firms do not screen, paying higher wages to all 
employees is unprofitable because most employees shirk. Thus, any local deviation from this 
bundle of job characteristics reduces profits. However, there is a second local profit maximum if 
firms screen employees and offer full discretion to employees with a good reputation only and 
pay them high wages. Given that wages are high (w≥20), profits are substantially lower if 
discretion is limited. Profits are also reduced if the employer does not screen workers but offers 
high wages to all of them. Furthermore, if full discretion and high wages are offered to 
employees with a good reputation, profits are reduced if the employer cuts their wages because 
these employees reciprocate by exerting less effort. Again, any local deviation from this bundle 
of job characteristics reduces profits. Our results thus indicate that job discretion is profitable 
only if firms are willing to pay high efficiency wages and vice versa – a finding that strengthens 
our confidence that the positive correlation between wages and HPWS found in many studies 
(e.g., Osterman 2006) is caused by the complementarity between high wages and HPWS.  
In our experiment the global maximum is the one where good jobs are offered. However, 
it is difficult for subjects to figure this out. Several authors in the HRM literature (e.g., Pil and 
MacDuffie 1996) have pointed out that employers may limit their search for better solutions to 
merely local improvements over their current HRM system. But, as the previous paragraph 
documents, local search, and the associated marginal changes, will not be profitable; as a 
consequence, employers may completely refrain from moving towards HPWS. In this case, the 
spreading of HPWS will be driven by entry of new firms using innovative work systems and exit 
of traditional firms. This implication is consistent with the pattern that HPWS are common in 
“greenfield” and “reconstituted” sites but not in “brownfield” sites (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). 
A prominent alternative theory that explains the correlation between high wage rents and 
high discretion (i.e., little monitoring) is based on differences in monitoring costs and uses a 
variant of efficiency wage theory (e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1986). If monitoring costs are high, it 
is more profitable for firms to rely on wage rents and the firing threat as a worker discipline 
device, which implies that jobs are characterized by high wages and little monitoring. In contrast, 
if monitoring costs are low, it is more profitable to pay low wages and to discipline workers via 
monitoring. This means that there is also a bundling of job attributes that may lead to the co-
existence of good and bad jobs, but this heterogeneity requires variations in monitoring 
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technology. The empirical evidence, however, suggests that good and bad jobs coexist in the 
same industry despite the absence of apparent technological differences.30 Our approach is 
capable of explaining these differences because it relies on a very different mechanism. In our 
set-up, employers have to trust their employees to provide high effort and employees have to be 
trustworthy either for intrinsic or for strategic reasons. Employers who do not trust their 
employees will not provide good jobs, and employees who are narrowly self-interested will not 
invest in reputation formation. Hence, differences in personal characteristics of employers and 
employees (their willingness to trust and to behave trustworthily) are sufficient to generate the 
co-existence of good and bad jobs in our setting.  
Many empirical studies stress the importance of screening for the viability of good jobs 
(see, e.g., the literature discussed in Ichniowski and Shaw 2003 and Oyer and Schaefer 2010). 
These studies typically do not distinguish between screening for skills and screening for personal 
characteristics. Our results suggest, however, that it is the screening for “work attitude” or “work 
ethic” that is a key causal determinant for the viability of good jobs. Recent findings by Huang 
and Cappelli (2010) support our results and interpretations of screening. Using a national sample 
of US employers, they examine the extent to which firms screen applicants for work ethic as well 
as for skills and work experience. In particular, screening for work ethic is associated with 
greater employee autonomy, which results in increased opportunities for shirking, less 
supervision of employees, and higher rent-sharing. In contrast, screening for more traditional 
human capital measures does not produce these correlations. Thus, it is screening for “work 
ethic” rather than screening for specific skills that is highly correlated with HPWS. However, 
Huang and Cappelli acknowledge that their data do not permit causal inferences because they are 
cross sectional.31 
                                                 
30 For example, there do not seem to be any technological differences between Costco and Wal-Mart’s Sam’s Club, 
but Costco pays 40 percent higher wages, offers much more generous benefits, on-the-job training, and more job 
security. However, taking employee productivity into account (sales per employee), Costco’s labor costs are lower 
than those of Sam’s Club. Furthermore, if anything, Costco seems to be somewhat more profitable than Sam’s Club. 
See Cascio (2006) for a detailed case study. For other examples, see Osterman (2009, p. 29) and the references cited 
there.  
31 The importance of screening for work attitude is also sown by case studies on the implementation of HPWS in 
individual companies such as, e.g., Southwest Airlines. O’Reilly and Pfeffer (2000) report that the Southwest 
Airlines CEO explains his company’s recruitment strategy as follows: “We draft great attitudes. If you don’t have a 
good attitude, we don’t want you, no matter how skilled you are. We can change skill levels through training. We 
can’t change attitude” (p. 38). Ichniowski et al. (1997) also stress the importance of screening for personality traits. 
Their study includes the following question: “Was an extensive selection procedure used to hire new workers, 
including tests for personality traits needed for cooperative team environments and efforts to set clear expectations 
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Our paper also suggests that variation in the intensity of labor market competition for 
workers is an important determinant of the viability of HPWS. Industrial relations that prevent 
employers from selecting workers according to information about work attitude are an obstacle 
for the introduction of HWPS. If unions enforce closed shops that prohibit firms from employing 
non-union members, or if they enforce inside hiring based on seniority rather than merit, HPWS 
may be discouraged. If the firm’s selection of employees is constrained, employees have lower 
incentives to invest in a good reputation. This is consistent with the empirical evidence reported 
in Ichniowski et al. (1997), showing that unionization is highly negatively correlated with all 
other innovative HRM practices in the steel industry,32 and with Liu et al. (2009), who conduct a 
multi-industry survey in Ireland, finding that an increase in union representation leads to a 
significant decrease in the use of HPWS. However, these papers do not identify the causal 
mechanism that drives this effect. Our findings suggest that it is not unionization per se but 
particular interventions in the hiring or promotion process that inhibit the introduction of HWPS. 
This may explain why unionization displays no negative impact on the adoption of HPWS in 
some studies (e.g., Osterman 1994). Future work will thus benefit from information about how 
exactly unions and other stakeholders affect the screening, hiring, and promotion processes in 
firms.  
The main limitation of our empirical study is that it is restricted to two causal factors 
(screening and competition) among many potential factors that may affect the viability and 
dissemination of HPWS. The empirical literature has pointed to many other factors such as firm 
size, monitoring cost, the extent of integration in international markets, whether firms primarily 
compete by reducing cost or by increasing product quality, the skill requirements of technology, 
whether it operates in a high profit industry, whether firm owners put special weight on 
employee welfare, and the degree to which firms’ output relies on computer technologies (see 
Osterman 1994; Ichniowski and Shaw 2003; Lazear and Oyer 2010; and the references therein). 
An experimental study will never be able to fully address all these factors. However, it may be 
very useful to single out specific factors, to test whether they have a causal impact, and to 
analyze the pathway by which they effect the functioning of HPWS. 
                                                                                                                                                             
about required work behaviors of the new workers?” This screening variable is highly correlated with all other 
HRM practices used in HPWS. Furthermore, the authors report that the “isolated” correlation between screening and 
productivity is small, but large in conjunction with complementary HRM practices such as training, team work, 
flexible job assignments, and employment security. 
32 The correlation table is provided in the working paper version of this paper, Ichniowski et al. (1995, Table 2). 
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6 Conclusions 
Lenin is right – up to a point: Offering discretion to an agent invites shirking and is not profitable 
on its own. However, if offering discretion improves the agent’s productivity, if it is combined 
with paying a high wage that grants a substantial rent, and if the principal can screen the agent 
based on past behavior and restrict such job offers to agents with good reputations, this combined 
trust strategy becomes profitable and outperforms a job strategy based on control. Our 
experiments show that offering discretion, paying high wages, and screening are complements 
that reinforce each other. This leads to an endogenous clustering of job attributes into “good” 
jobs, which are characterized by high effort discretion, high effort demands, high wages, and a 
high share of the surplus, and “bad” jobs, which are characterized by low effort discretion, low 
effort demands, low wages, and a low share of the surplus. 
The opportunity for employers to screen employees and for employees to build a 
reputation is a treatment variation in our experiments. This enables us to show that screening and 
reputation formation opportunities are causal for the viability of good jobs. However, even if 
employers can screen employees, not all of them offer good jobs to employees with a good 
reputation – even though this would increase their profits. Also, not all employees acquire a good 
reputation – even though this would increase their overall incomes. The interaction of 
heterogeneous employers and employees leads to a segmented labor market. Our second 
treatment variation shows that if screening is complemented by labor market competition, 
suboptimal behavior is largely removed, which causes a considerable increase in the share of 
good jobs and the share of employees with a good reputation. This results in large welfare gains 
for both employers and employees. 
Our experimental results complement the empirical literature by showing that screening 
and competition are causal factors for the viability and dissemination of “good” jobs. We hope 
that our paper stimulates new empirical research. For example, it would be interesting to better 
understand how firms screen employees. What is the importance of technical skills as compared 
to soft skills (reliability, trustworthiness, intrinsic motivation, etc.)? How do firms use reference 
letters, employee referrals, interviews, and tests to evaluate the personality traits of an applicant? 
Are personal recommendations and letters of reference more reliable in small communities, 
where employers are more likely to know each other than in large metropolitan areas? What 
determines the intensity of screening? How does the thickness of the relevant labor market affect 
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the dissemination of HPWS? Is this affected by legal constraints, such as non-compete 
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Economic Origins of Good Jobs 
 
--- Supplementary Appendix --- 
 
A1  Behavioral Types among Employees 
We document a rough classification of the types of employees in our base and screening 
treatments in this section. We acquire this classification of employees by conducting both the 
base and the screening treatments consecutively in every session (in the sessions in which we 
conducted the competition treatment, only the competition treatment was played). When the 
subjects were playing the first treatment, they did not know that a second treatment would be 
played subsequently. The fact that we conducted the later second treatment thus cannot have 
influenced the subjects’ behaviors in the first treatments. Subjects retained their roles as either 
employer or employee in the second treatment. We only use the data from the respective first 
treatment in the paper itself, in order not to confound the results with possible order effects. In 
this section, however, the fact that all employees participated in both treatments enables us to 
derive a type classification that accounts for possible behavioral differences under different 
treatment conditions.  
In Section 3 of the paper, we claim that about 70 percent of our subjects in the base 
treatment can be classified as selfish and 30 percent as fair (see footnote 11). In Result 5b, we 
claim that there were narrowly self-interested types among the employees who did not 
reciprocate generous wages with high effort levels. To determine the different employee types, 








The actual effort in period t is denoted by 	݁௜௧, the minimum effort employee i  could choose in 
period t  is denoted by ݁௜௧ (which is 1 if a trust contract was offered and 3 if a control contract 
2 
was offered), and ݁௜௙௧ denotes the fair effort for employee i in period t. The fair effort is the effort 
level that equalizes the employee's and employer's payoffs given the contract the employer 
offers, i.e., ܾ݁௜௙௧ െ ݓ ൌ ݓ െ ݁௜௙௧, rounded to the next integer (since only integer values were 
allowed as effort choices). We only consider cases where the wage was high enough so that ݁௜௙௧ 
exceeds ݁௜௧. ௜ܰ denotes the number of these periods for employee i  (we have at least one period 
for each employee in each treatment). Thus, an employee who always chooses the fair effort 
level ݁௜௙௧ has a reciprocity index of 1, while an employee who always chooses the minimum 
effort level ݁௜௧ has a reciprocity index of 0. We have a reciprocity index for each employee in 
both the base and in the screening treatments.  
The left panel of Figure A1 plots the reciprocity indices for each employee in the base 
and the screening treatments against each other. We round these indices to natural numbers in 




FIGURE A1.—Classification of employees’ types. In the left panel, each dot represents one 
employee. In the right panel, we round the reciprocity indices to natural numbers illustrating our 
classification of employees’ types. The size of the bubbles is proportional to the number of 
employees in each category. 
  
                                                            
1 Note that there is only one employee with an index of one in the base treatment and of zero in the screening 
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Narrowly self-interested types: About 20 percent of the employees (23 out of 108) have a 
reciprocity index close to zero in both the screening and the base treatments. These employees 
do not reciprocate high wages with high effort in either treatment, even though this would be 
profitable in the screening treatment. In the base treatment, they choose an average effort of 2.78 
and earn an average payoff of 7.37, a little above the overall average of 6.95. In the screening 
treatment, these employees choose an average effort of 3.35 and are thus stuck with a low 
reputation, meaning that they are offered few jobs with full discretion (only in 25 percent of the 
cases). As a consequence, their average income is only 7.35, considerably less than the overall 
average income of 9.51. 
Reciprocal types: About 30 percent of the employees (31 out of 108) have a reciprocity 
index close to one (or larger) in both treatments. These employees always reciprocate high wages 
with high effort. They choose an average effort of 4.71 in the base treatment but only earn an 
average payoff of 6.70. This is a little less than the overall average, but these employees 
voluntarily choose to sacrifice some of their own payoff in order to reciprocate high wage offers. 
They spend an average effort of 5.96 in the screening treatment and acquire a medium or high 
reputation. They are therefore offered more job offers with full discretion (in 46 percent of the 
cases) and attain an average income of 9.33. 
Strategic types: About 50 percent of the employees (53 out of 108) have a reciprocity 
index close to zero in the base treatment and close to one (or larger) in the screening treatment. 
These employees act strategically and reciprocate if their performance record is observed, but do 
not do so if future employers are unable to detect low effort. They look like the narrowly self-
interested types in the base treatment: They choose an average effort of 3.08, and their average 
income is 6.85. In the screening treatment, however, they closely approximate the reciprocal 
types. They choose an average effort of 5.97, acquire a medium or high reputation, and are 
offered jobs with full discretion in the majority of the cases (52 percent). As a result, they receive 
a high average income (10.60).  
 
A2  Optimal Contracts in the Base Treatment with Inequity Aversion 
In Section 3.2 of the paper we claim that the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model predicts that contracts 
with limited discretion and low wages are optimal in the base treatment if the fraction of fair 
employees is smaller than 60 percent. In this appendix we derive the optimal contract and the 
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predicted behavior of employers and workers as a function of the fraction of fair-minded subjects 
in the Fehr-Schmidt model. This model assumes that some players dislike inequality and have a 
utility function  
    ( , ) max ,0 max ,0i i j i i j i i i jU m m m m m m m       
where im  is the monetary payoff of player i and ,i i   reflect the degree to which the player 
dislikes inequality to his disadvantage and to his advantage, respectively, with 0 i i   . A 
player is called “fair” if 12i   and 2i  . In a dictator game such a player is willing to share 
the pie equally and in an ultimatum game he is prepared to reject any offer that gives him less 
than 40 percent of the pie. A player with 12i  and 2i   is called “selfish.” For simplicity we 
assume that wages and effort can be chosen continuously and that all fair players have 
0.5 1i   and 2i  , and that all selfish players have 0i i   . Suppose that fraction x  of 
players is fair and fraction 1 x  is selfish. Analyzing the game by backward induction, we first 
ask how the different types of workers behave for any given contract offer: 
 At the last stage a selfish worker always chooses e e , where ݁ is the lowest possible 
effort level that a worker can choose given the contract, while a fair worker chooses the 




      that aims at equalizing payoffs. 
 When the employer offers a contract with full discretion a selfish worker will accept any 
offer with 1w  . A fair worker accepts the contract if  
    max ,0 max ,0 0f f f f fw e b e w w e w e b e w              




   and it is smaller than 0 if 1
fe  . Thus the 




      we 
get that the fair type accepts a full discretion contract if 2.6w  .  
 When the principal offers a contract with limited discretion a selfish worker will accept 
any offer with 3w  . By the same argument as above (but now with 4b  ) a fair worker 
accepts the contract if 6.6w  .  
5 
We now ask which contract offer maximizes the monetary payoff of the employer   
  (1 )fx b e w x b e w          . 
 Suppose the employer offers a contract with full discretion and 3w  . Substituting 5b  , 




      yields 
105 5 1
6
xx w        . Note that 




      . Thus, if the fraction of fair workers is larger than 60 
percent, the employer should choose w  such that 2 10 30
5 1
f we w    . If 0.6x  the 
employer has two possibilities. He can either offer 1w  which is accepted only by a 
selfish worker and yields expected profit  0 (1 ) 5 1 1 4 4x x x         . Or he can 
offer 3w  which is accepted by both types and yields profit 5 1 3 2     . The second 
option yields a higher payoff than the first if 0.5x  . Thus, the profit maximizing full 
discretion contract offers  
 
30  if 0.6 45 25  if 0.6
3  if 0.5 0.6    and yields   2  if 0.5 0.6





               
 
 Suppose now that the employer offers a contract with limited discretion and 8w  . 




      yields 
812 12 1
5
xx w        . Note 




      . Thus, if the fraction of fair workers is larger than 62.5 
percent, the employer should choose w  such that 2 10 25
4 1
f we w    . If 0.625x 
the employer has two possibilities. He can either offer 3w  which is accepted only by a 
selfish worker and yields expected profit  0 (1 ) 4 3 3 9 9x x x         . Or he can 
offer 7w  which is accepted by both types and yields profit 4 3 7 5     . The second 
option yields a higher payoff than the first if 4 0.4
9
x   . Thus, the profit maximizing 
limited discretion contract offers  
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0.625 0.62525  if 28 13 if 
7  if 0.4 0.625   and yields   5  if 0.4 0.625





               
 
Comparing profits with full discretion contracts to profits with limited discretion 
contracts we see that if the fraction of fair subjects is smaller than 60 percent, contracts with 
limited discretion and low wages of either 7 or 3 are optimal. A selfish principal offers a contract 
with limited discretion and a wage of 3 if x ൑ 0. 4ത because he is interested in his monetary 
payoff only. A fair employer also offers a contract with limited discretion but with a wage of 7 
that gets him as close as possible to equal payoffs. Both types of workers accept this contract 
offer and choose e ൌ 3. The fair principal’s monetary payoff is then 3 ∙ 4 െ 7 ൌ 5 and an agent’s 
monetary payoff is 7 െ 3 ൌ 4. The principal’s utility is thus 5 െ β ൐ 4. If instead he offers a 
contract with limited discretion and a wage of 3, his utility is ሺ1 െ xሻሺ1 െ βሻ9. Even if x ൌ 0, 
the latter exceeds the former only if β ൏ 0.5, but we assume 0.5 ൏ β ൏ 1 for fair individuals. 
 
A3  Clustering of Job Attributes 
Figure 1 in Section 4.1 of the paper shows the clustering of job attributes. The average wage, the 
average requested effort, and the average offered share of the surplus are all significantly higher 
in contracts with full discretion than in those with limited discretion. In this section, we provide 
additional information showing that the clustering of job attributes is also evident when looking 
at the distributions of the job attributes (see footnote 15 of the paper). 
Figure A2 shows relative frequencies of wage offers in both contract types in the base 
and the screening treatment, respectively. It is clear that the distribution of wages is very 
different in the two types of contracts; given the contract type, however, it is qualitatively very 
similar in both treatments. In limited discretion contracts, the mode of the distribution is at low 
wages (5≤w<10) and higher wages occur monotonically less often. In contrast, the mode of the 
















 Wage Offer Wage Offer 
          
FIGURE A2.—Relative Frequency of Wage Offers in the Base and the Screening Treatments. 
 
Figures A3 to A6 provide information about individual contract offers. The figures show 
the clustering of job attributes separately in both treatments and in both types of contracts. Each 
bubble in the figures represents a combination of job attributes, and the size of the bubbles 
indicates the frequency with which a given combination of job attributes was offered. The left 
panel of Figure A3 shows the combination of wages and requested effort levels in contracts with 
limited discretion in the base treatment. It is clear that most contract offers cluster at low wage 
offers and low levels of requested effort. The right panel shows the combination of wages and 
requested effort levels in contracts with full discretion. In this case, most contract offers cluster 
at high wage offers and high levels of requested effort. Figure A4 shows that the same clustering 
prevails in the screening treatment. Figures A5 and A6 show that low wage offers and low shares 
of the surplus cluster in contracts with limited discretion, while high wage offers and high shares 




 Base Treatment 










 Wage Offer Wage Offer 
FIGURE A3.—Wage Offers and Requested Effort in the Base Treatment. Dots represent 
contract offers. The size of a bubble indicates the frequency with which a given wage-requested 
effort combination was chosen. 
 
 Screening Treatment 










 Wage Offer Wage Offer 
FIGURE A4.—Wage Offers and Requested Effort in the Screening Treatment. Dots represent 
contract offers. The size of a bubble indicates the frequency with which a given wage-requested 
effort combination was chosen. 
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 Base Treatment 














 Wage Offer Wage Offer 
FIGURE A5.—Wage Offers and Offered Share of Surplus in the Base Treatment. Dots 
represent contract offers. The size of a bubble indicates the frequency with which a given wage-
share of surplus combination was chosen. 
 
 Screening Treatment 














 Wage Offer Wage Offer 
FIGURE A6.—Wage Offers and Offered Share of Surplus in the Screening Treatment. Dots 
represent contract offers. The size of a bubble indicates the frequency with which a given wage-
share of surplus combination was chosen. 
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A4  Time Effects 
In this section we provide more information on time effects. We claim that the clustering of job 
attributes is stable over time in footnote 15 in Section 4.1 of the paper. We show in Figure A7 
that the difference between the two contract types with regard to the wage offer, requested effort 
level, and offered share of the surplus is not only stable over time but, especially in the base 
treatment, that it becomes even more pronounced over time.  
 





























 Period Period 
 
 
FIGURE A7.—Clustering of Job Attributes over Time. 
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In footnote 28 of Section 4.5 of the paper we claim that the pattern of types of contract 
offers is stable over time in the competition treatment. Figure A8 shows the share of full 
discretion contract offers made to low reputation employees, contrasted to that offered to 
medium and high reputation employees; the figure thus corresponds to Figure 3 in the paper. We 
again consider only offers that employees actually received (see footnote 27 of the paper). Figure 
A8 shows that the fraction of full discretion contract offers made to medium and high reputation 
agents is stable over time, roughly at values between 70 and 80 percent, but it drops sharply to 
about 50 percent in the final period. There are almost no full discretion contract offers for low 
reputation agents. The 100 percent share in the final period is based on a single observation. 
 
 







































A5  Additional Regression Analyses with Squared Wage Terms 
In this section, we analyze the impact of including additional squared wage terms in our 
regression analyses. Regressions (1) and (3) in Table A1 are the main effort regression and the 
profit regression for the base treatment, respectively, as reported in Table 1 of the paper. In 
regressions (2) and (4) “wage squared” and the interaction of “limited” with “wage squared” are 
added as additional regressors. 
 
Table A1—Effort and Profit Regressions with Squared Wage Terms in Base Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
effort  





























































observations 658 658 810 810 
adj. R2 0.474 0.491 0.063 0.064 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. The effort regressions cluster by employees, control for individual fixed effects, and consider 
only accepted contracts as no effort is chosen if a contract is rejected. All contracts are included in the 
profit regressions to capture the effect of rejections on profits.  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
 
In the effort regression (2), the coefficients of both, “wage squared” and “limitedwage 
squared” are small and positive, and “limitedwage squared” is highly significant. Under 
contracts with full discretion (the omitted category) the wage effort relation is now slightly 
convex but basically unchanged (recall that wages almost never exceed 30). Under contracts with 
limited discretion, the squared wage terms lead to a u-shaped wage-effort relation that is 
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however basically flat in the relevant wage region between 5 and 10 where almost three quarters 
of the accepted wage offers with limited discretion are located. The positive but flatter wage-
effort relation under limited discretion contracts thus stems from observations with especially 
high wage offers. In the profit regression, we observe that the coefficient of “wage squared” is 
positive while the coefficient of “limitedwage squared” is negative. Both coefficients are 
insignificant. In comparison to the analysis without squared wage terms, we find that the effect 
of wages on profit under full discretion (the omitted category) is now u-shaped.  Almost 90 
percent of the accepted wage offers with full discretion are between 10 and 30, and for wages of 
about 10 and 30 the estimated profit coincides with the linear specification, but wages around 20 
lead to even lower estimated profits. As in the linear specification, there is no significant effect 
of wages on profits, as the coefficient of the linear wage term remains insignificant after the 
inclusion of the squared wage term. Looking at contracts with limited discretion, the coefficient 
on limited is now smaller but the regression constant compensates for this effect. The effect of 
wages on profit is now slightly concave but the relation remains basically unchanged. However, 
while “limited” and “limitedwage” are significant in the linear specification, none of the 
coefficients remain significant if the squared wage terms are included. These results show that 
the impact of wage on effort and profit is not exactly linear, but they also show that the basic 
pattern of the linear regression results remains unchanged. 
Regressions (1) and (3) in Table A2 are the main effort regression and the profit 
regression for the screening treatment, respectively, as reported in Table 2 of the paper. In 
regressions (2) and (4) “wage squared” and the interaction of “limited” with “wage squared” are 
added as additional regressors. In the effort regression (2), the coefficient of “wage squared” is 
small and negative and the one of “limitedwage squared” is small and positive. Both 
coefficients are insignificant. In the profit regression (4), the coefficient of “wage squared” is 
again negative (but now significant that the 5 percent level) and the one of “limitedwage 
squared” is again small and positive. The table reveals that also in the screening treatment, the 
impact of wages on effort and profit is indeed not linear, especially the impact of wage on profit 
has a pronounced concave shape, but it also reveals that the basic pattern of the linear regression 
results again does not change. 
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Table A2— Effort and Profit Regressions with Squared Wage Terms in Screening Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
effort  












































































































observations 655 655 745 745 
adj. R2 0.676 0.677 0.301 0.310 
Notes: The table reports coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
The effort regressions cluster by employees, control for individual fixed effects, and consider only accepted 
contracts as no effort is chosen if a contract is rejected. All contracts are included in the profit regressions to 
capture the effect of rejections on profits.  
*** denotes significance at 1 percent, ** at 5 percent, and * at 10 percent. 
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A6  Experimental Instructions 
Below we provide the English translation of our experimental instructions for the base and the 
screening treatment. We also provide the translation of the part of the instructions of the 
competition treatment that explains the matching protocol. We finally provide the original 
German instructions. 
 
[Begin of instructions for the employers in the base and screening treatment.] 
 
General instructions for participants 
We are pleased to welcome you to this economic study. If you read the following instructions 
carefully, you can – depending on your decisions and those of the other participants – earn 
additional money in excess of the 10 CHF which you receive as an initial endowment for 
participating. It is thus very important that you read these instructions carefully. If you have 
questions, please ask them to us. Speaking with the other participants during the experiment is 
strictly prohibited. Violation of this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and from all 
payments. During the experiment, we will not speak of Swiss francs, but of points. Your entire 
income will thus first be calculated in points. The total number of points you earn during the 
experiment will then be converted to CHF at the end of the experiment, where the following 
exchange rate applies: 10 points = 1.25 CHF. At the end of today's experiment, you will receive 
the number of points earned during the experiment plus 10 CHF for appearing in cash. We will 
describe the exact procedure of the experiment on the next pages.  
 
The Experiment 
There are two types of participants in this experiment, employers and employees. The 
participants are equally distributed in these two roles. You play the role of an employer during 
the entire experiment. The experiment lasts for 15 periods. During each period, a random device 
assigns one of the employees to you. You will not learn of the identity of the persons assigned to 
you, neither during nor after the experiment. The other participants will also not be informed of 
your identity. This will guarantee the complete anonymity of the decisions. Here we will first 
give you a summary of the course of a period. More detailed information will follow on the next 
pages.  
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages. During the first stage, you as 
employer determine a labor contract in which you offer your employee the following: 1) You 
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choose the type of labor contract which you will offer your employee. You can choose between 
(i) a contract without limitation of the employee's choice possibilities with respect to the work 
effort; and (ii) a contract with limitation of the employee's choice possibilities with respect to the 
work effort. 2) You then choose the salary that you wish to offer the employee. 3) Finally, you 
select the requested work effort. 
Your decisions from the first stage will then be notified to your employee. The employee 
can then react to the contract you offer in the second stage: 1) He or she decides whether to 
accept or decline the offered contract. 2) If he accepts the labor contract, he decides on the actual 
work effort. The larger the actual work effort, the greater is your profit. The employee incurs 
costs, however, from the work effort he chooses; these increase as the actual work effort 
increases. The period ends after the second stage. The employer's and the employee's decisions 
determine both your profits as well as the employee's income in this period. There are a total of 
15 periods. Your profit in this experiment is thus the sum of your profits over the 15 periods; the 
employee's entire income is the sum of his income over the 15 periods. 
 
Detailed information about the course of a period 
In each period, you choose the type of labor contract that you wish to offer. You may choose 
between a contract without limitation of the employee's choice possibilities with respect to the 
work effort and a contract with limitation of the employee's choice possibilities with respect to 
the work effort. In case of a contract with a limitation of choice possibilities, your employee – 
provided he accepts the contract – must select a work effort of at least 3. In a contract without 
limitation of choice possibilities, your employee can also choose a work effort of 2 or the 
minimum work effort of 1. In addition to the decision on the type of contract, you must also 
determine the salary offered and the requested work effort. Your employee is not bound to the 
requested work effort; he may also choose a greater or smaller work effort. In case of a contract 
with limitation of the choice possibilities with respect to work effort, however, your employee 
must at least choose a work effort of 3 – provided he accepts the contract. If the employee 
accepts the contract, you must pay the salary offered in any case, regardless of the worker's 
actual work effort. 
The following applies with respect to the requested and actual work effort: You can 
choose any integer between 1 and 10 for the requested work effort. The lowest work effort is 1 
and the highest is 10. It is not the requested work effort, however, but the actual work effort, that 
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is decisive for determining the profit which you ultimately earn. In case of a contract without 
limitation of choice possibilities in work effort, your employee can also choose any integer value 
between 1 and 10 as his actual work effort. In case of a contract with limitation of choice 
possibilities in work effort, your employee can only choose any integer value between 3 and 10 
as his actual work effort. Your employee is thus forced to select a minimum work effort of 3. 
In case of a contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, you 
will earn 5 points for each actual unit of work effort. If, for example, the actual work effort is 1, 
you will earn 5 x 1 = 5 points; if the actual work effort is 7, you will then receive 5 x 7 = 35 
points, etc. In case of a contract with limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, 
you will earn 4 points for each actual unit of work effort. If, for example, the actual work effort 
is 3 (the minimum for this contract), you will earn 4 x 3 = 12 points; if the actual work effort is 
7, you will earn 4 x 7 = 28 points, etc.  
Thus, there are two differences between the two types of contracts: 1) In case of a 
contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, your employee can 
select the minimum actual work effort of 1. In case of a contract with limitation in choice 
possibilities with respect to work effort, your employee must opt for a minimum actual work 
effort of 3. 2) In case of a contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work 
effort, you earn 5 points per actual unit of work effort. In case of a contract with limitation in 
choice possibilities with respect to work effort, you earn 4 points per actual unit of work effort. 
The actual work effort is associated with costs for your employee. Each unit of actual 
work effort costs your employee 1 point (independent of the type of contract). If the actual work 
effort is 1, this costs your employee 1 point, if the actual work effort is 2, this costs your 
employee 2 points, etc. The following applies with respect to the salary offered: the salary 
offered must cover the costs of the requested work effort. If, for example, you want a work effort 
of 5, the salary offered must amount to at least 5. 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Before you make your decisions in a period, a table is shown for your information. This table 
indicates the actual work effort your present employee selected in the last 3 periods. If the 
employee declined a contract, "contract declined" will appear instead of the actual work effort. 
You will receive a new table in every period, as a new employee will be assigned to you every 
period. Your employee also knows that you as employer are aware of the actual work effort he 
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produced in the last 3 periods. How the table is to be interpreted: The first line of the table (see 
picture) indicates the actual work effort of your present employee in the last period. The second 
line indicates the actual work effort in the second to last and the third line the actual work effort 
in the third to last period. If the contract was declined in a period, you will find the text "contract 
declined". 
[Screen shot showing the table.] 
The information in the table is incomplete in the first three periods of the experiment, as there are 
not enough previous periods. The text on this line states, "information not yet available". The 
information over the last three periods is first complete beginning in period 4. 
Once you have made your decisions on the type of contract, the amount of the salary 
offered, and the requested work effort during the first stage of the experiment, your decisions 
will be notified to the employee. During the second stage, the employee will then decide whether 
to accept or to decline the offered contract. If he accepts the labor contract, he then decides on 
the actual work effort. Once your employee has made his decisions, an informational screen will 
appear. You will then be informed of your employee's decisions and you will once again see 
your own decisions. Furthermore, your profit and your employee's income for this period will 
also be shown. Following this, the next period begins. The experiment runs for a total of 15 
periods. A new employee will be randomly assigned to you in every period. (If there are an odd 
number of participants in the experiment, it can happen that no employee will be assigned to you 
in one period.) 
 
Calculation of profits and income at the end of each period 
Your profit at the end of each period depends both on your decisions and those of your employee 
during the second stage. Your profit at the end of the experiment is the sum of the profits 
stemming from the 15 periods. You can be confronted with two possibilities at the end of each 
period: 1) Your employee declines the contract. In this case, you do not have to pay the salary 
offered, and your employee cannot choose a work effort. Both your profit and your employee's 
income amount to 0 points in this period. 2) Your employee accepts the contract. In this case, 
your profit in points depends on the type of contract, the salary offered, and the actual work 
effort. The requested work effort does not play any role in the calculation of your profit. A) In 
case of a contract without limitation in the choice possibilities, your employee can choose an 
actual work amount between 1 and 10. Your profit is then calculated as follows: Your profit = 5 
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x actual work effort – salary offered. B) In case of a contract with limitation in the choice 
possibilities, your employee must choose an actual work amount between 3 and 10. Your profit 
is then calculated as follows: Your profit = 4 x actual work effort – salary offered. It is thus 
possible that a loss may be incurred in individual periods if the actual work effort is relatively 
low and the salary is relatively high. Any losses will be offset with profits from other periods or 
with the initial endowment.2 In case of acceptance of the contract, your employee's income in 
points depends on the salary offered and the actual work effort. An employee's income in a 
period is calculated as follows: Employee's income = salary offered – actual work effort. 
 
Procedure on the computer 
You enter your decision on the type of contract, the salary offered, and the requested work effort 
on the following computer screen: 
[Screen shown here; in the screening treatment it includes information about an agent’s past 
effort choices.] 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
On the upper part of the screen, you will find the table with information on the actual work effort 
of your present employee in the last 3 periods. (The example shown here is completely 
arbitrary.) 
In the middle of the screen, you see the two buttons, "Contract without limitation in choice 
possibilities with respect to work effort" or "Contract with limitation in choice possibilities with 
respect to work effort". Please click the corresponding button for your decision. Then determine 
the salary offered; to do so, enter the corresponding number in the upper blue field. Finally, you 
can determine the requested work effort; to do this, enter the corresponding number in the lower 
blue field. The salary offered must at least cover the costs of the requested work effort. When 
you have made your decisions, click the OK button. You can revise your decisions for as long as 
you have not pressed the OK button. Do you have any questions? 
  
                                                            
2 This footnote was not included in the instructions and we add it here to explain the procedure that applied when 
subject’s accumulated losses exceeded the initial endowment and all possible prior gains. In this case, the subject 
would see a screen informing her or him of the situation. The subject then has the choice to quit the experiment or to 
continue. If the subject continues, it might happen the subject has a loss at the end of the experiment and we stressed 
that the subject would have to pay these losses. We also explained that there are strategies that exclude the 
possibility of losses. None of our subjects opted out and all of our subjects earned positive profits. 
20 
Test questions 
[The grey shaded text and question number 3 is only included in the screening treatment.] 
1. Assume your contract offer got rejected. What is your profit? What is the income of your 
employee? 
2. Assume you want to enter a requested work effort of 7. What is the minimum wage you have 
to offer? 
3. Assume you see the following table with information on your screen. [Screen shows that the 
employer chose a work effort of 5 in the last and of 8 in the second to last period. For the 
third to last period it says “information not yet available.”] 
3.1. What is the current period of the experiment? 
3.2. Which work effort did the employee chose in the first period of the experiment? 
4. Assume your current employee chose an actual work effort of 8 in the last period, of 10 in 
the second to last period, and of 3 in the third to last period. Assume you offered a contract 
without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort. The offered wage is 25, 
the requested work effort is 10. The employee accepts the contract offer. 
4.1. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 10. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
4.2. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 5. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
4.3. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 1. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
5. Assume your current employee chose an actual work effort of 8 in the last period, of 10 in 
the second to last period, and of 3 in the third to last period. Assume you offered a contract 
with limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort. The offered wage is 25, the 
requested work effort is 10. The employee accepts the contract offer. 
5.1. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 10. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
5.2. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 5. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
5.3. Your employee chooses an actual work effort of 3. What is your profit? What is the 
income of the employee? 
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Please raise your hand when you have solved all the test questions. We will then come to your 
workplace and check your answers. 
[If a subject made a mistake, we explained the relevant part of the instructions again and asked 
the subject to try the question again. The experiment started only after all subjects had answered 
all questions correctly.] 
 




[Begin of instructions for the employees in the base and screening treatment.] 
 
General instructions for participants 
[Same text as in instructions for employers.]  
 
The Experiment 
There are two types of participants in this experiment, employers and employees. The 
participants are equally distributed in these two roles. You play the role of an employee during 
the entire experiment. The experiment lasts for 15 periods. During each period, a random device 
assigns one of the employers to you. You will not learn of the identity of the persons assigned to 
you, neither during nor after the experiment. The other participants will also not be informed of 
your identity. This will guarantee the complete anonymity of the decisions. Here we will first 
give you a summary of the course of a period. More detailed information will follow on the next 
pages.  
Each period of the experiment consists of two stages. During the first stage, your 
employer determines a labor contract which he offers to you. 1) Your employer can choose the 
type of labor contract which he offers to you. He can choose between (i) a contract without 
limitation of your choice possibilities with respect to the work effort and (ii) a contract with 
limitation of your choice possibilities with respect to the work effort. 2) Your employer then 
chooses the salary that he offers to you. 3) Finally, he selects the work effort that he requests 
from you. In the second stage you will be notified which contract the employer offers you. You 
can then react to this contract: 1) You can decide whether to accept or decline the contract. 2) If 
you accept the labor contract, you decide on the actual work effort. The period ends after the 
second stage. The employer's and the employee's decisions determine both your income as well 
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as the employer's profit in this period. There are a total of 15 periods. Your total income in this 
experiment is thus the sum of your income over the 15 periods; the employer's entire profit is the 
sum of his profit over the 15 periods. 
 
Detailed information about the course of a period 
In each period, your employer chooses whether he will offer you a contract without limitation of 
your choice possibilities with respect to the work effort or a contract with limitation of your 
choice possibilities with respect to the work effort. The difference between the two contracts is 
that – provided you accept the contract – you must select a work effort of at least 3 in case of a 
contract with a limitation of your choice possibilities. In a contract without limitation of choice 
possibilities, you can also choose a work effort of 2 or the minimum work effort of 1. In addition 
to the decision on the type of contract, your employer must also determine the salary offered and 
the requested work effort. You are not bound to the requested work effort, however; you can – 
provided you accept the contract – also choose a greater or smaller work effort. In case of a 
contract with limitation of the choice possibilities with respect to work effort, however, you must 
at least choose a work effort of 3 – provided you accept the contract. If you accept the contract, 
your employer must pay the salary offered in any case, regardless of the actual work effort you 
choose. If you decline the contract, your employer pays you no salary and you cannot choose a 
work effort. 
The following applies with respect to the requested and actual work effort: Your 
employer can choose any integer between 1 and 10 for the requested work effort. The lowest 
work effort is 1 and the highest is 10. It is not the requested work effort, however, but the actual 
work effort, that is decisive for determining the profit which your employer ultimately earns. In 
case of a contract without limitation of choice possibilities in work effort, you can also choose 
any integer value between 1 and 10 as your actual work effort. In case of a contract with 
limitation of choice possibilities in work effort, you can only choose any integer value between 3 
and 10 as your actual work effort. You are thus forced to select a minimum work effort of 3. In 
case of a contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, your 
employer will earn 5 points for each actual unit of work effort. If, for example, the actual work 
effort is 1, he will earn 5 x 1 = 5 points; if the actual work effort is 7, he will then receive 5 x 7 = 
35 points, etc. In case of a contract with limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work 
effort, your employer will earn 4 points for each actual unit of work effort. If, for example, the 
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actual work effort is 3 (the minimum for this contract), he will earn 4 x 3 = 12 points; if the 
actual work effort is 7, he will earn 4 x 7 = 28 points, etc.  
Thus, there are two differences between the two types of contracts: 1) In case of a 
contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, you can select the 
minimum actual work effort of 1. In case of a contract with limitation in choice possibilities with 
respect to work effort, you must opt for a minimum actual work effort of 3. 2) In case of a 
contract without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort, your employer 
earns 5 points per actual unit of work effort. In case of a contract with limitation in choice 
possibilities with respect to work effort, your employer earns 4 points per actual unit of work 
effort. 
The actual work effort is associated with costs for you. Each unit of actual work effort 
costs you 1 point (independent of the type of contract). If you choose an actual work effort of 1, 
this costs you 1 point; if you choose an actual work effort of 2, this costs you 2 points, etc. Once 
your employer has made his decisions on the type of contract, the amount of the salary offered, 
and the requested work effort during the first stage of the experiment, his decisions will be 
notified to you. During the second stage, you must then decide whether to accept or to decline 
the offered contract. If you accept the labor contract, you must then decide on the actual work 
effort. 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Before you make your decisions in a period, a table is shown for your information. This table 
indicates your actual work effort in the last 3 periods. If you declined a contract, "contract 
declined" will appear instead of the actual work effort. The table presented to you will also be 
shown to your present employer, before he determines the labor contract. In each period, your 
employer at the time knows the actual work effort you selected in the last 3 periods. This also 
means that the work effort that you choose in the current period will be notified to your next 
employers. After your employer is shown the table, he determines the labor contract that he 
offers you. How the table is to be interpreted: The first line of the table (see picture) indicates the 
actual work effort you chose in the last period. The second line indicates the actual work effort in 
the second to last and the third line the actual work effort in the third to last period. If the 
contract was declined in a period, you will find the text "contract declined". 
[Screen shot showing the table.] 
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The information in the table is incomplete in the first three periods of the experiment, as there are 
not enough previous periods. The text on this line states, "information not yet available". The 
information over the last three periods is first complete beginning in period 4.  
Once you have made your decisions, an informational screen will appear. You will then be 
informed of your employer's decisions and you will once again see your own decisions. 
Furthermore, your income and your employer's profits for this period will also be shown. 
Following this, the next period begins. The experiment runs for a total of 15 periods. A new 
employer will be randomly assigned to you in every period. (If there are an odd number of 
participants in the experiment, it can happen that no employer will be assigned to you in one 
period.) 
 
Calculation of income and profit at the end of each period 
Your income at the end of each period depends both on your decisions and those of your 
employer during the first stage. Your income at the end of the experiment is the sum of your 
income stemming from the 15 periods. You can be confronted with two possibilities at the end of 
each period: 1) You decline the contract. In this case, your employer does not have to pay the 
salary offered, and you cannot choose a work effort. Both your income and your employee's 
profits amount to 0 points in this period. 2) You accept the contract. In this case, your income in 
points depends on the salary offered and the actual work effort. The requested work effort does 
not play any role in the calculation of your income. Your income is then calculated as follows: 
Your income = salary offered – actual work effort. Your employer's profit in points depends on 
type of contract, the salary offered, and the actual work effort. The requested work effort does 
not play any role in the calculation of his profit. A) In case of a contract without limitation in the 
choice possibilities, the profit in a period is calculated as follows: Your employer's profit = 5 x 
actual work effort – salary offered. B) In case of a contract with limitation in the choice 
possibilities, the profit in a period is calculated as follows: Your employer's profit = 4 x actual 
work effort – salary offered. It is thus possible that an employer may incur a loss in individual 
periods if the actual work effort is relatively low and the salary is relatively high. Any losses will 
be offset with profits from other periods or with the initial endowment. 
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Procedure on the computer 
You enter your decision whether you accept the contract and the actual work effort in case of 
acceptance on the following computer screen: 
[Screen shown here; in the screening treatment it includes information about an agent’s past 
effort choices.] 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
On the upper part of the screen, you will find the table with information on your actual work 
effort in the last 3 periods. (The example shown here is completely arbitrary.) 
The middle of the screen shows the type of contract, the salary offered, and the requested work 
effort. (The contract offered to you in the experiment can vary from the example above, which is 
chose arbitrarily.) Underneath, you will find the buttons "Yes" and "No" next to the question "Do 
you accept the contract?" Click the corresponding button to make your decision. If you accept 
the contract, you must also select a work effort. Enter the pertinent number into the blue field. If 
you decline the contract, you cannot enter a work effort. When you have made your decisions, 
click the OK button. You can revise your decisions for as long as you have not pressed the OK 
button. Do you have any questions? 
 
Test questions: 
[The grey shaded text and question number 2 is only included in the screening treatment.] 
1. Assume you reject a contract offer. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
2. Assume you see the following table with information on your screen. [Screen shows that the 
employer chose a work effort of 5 in the last and of 8 in the second to last period. For the 
third to last period it says “information not yet available.”] 
2.1. What is the current period of the experiment? 
2.2. Which work effort did you chose in the first period of the experiment? 
2.3. Assume you choose an actual work effort of 3 in the current period. Please complete the 
following table with information that would be shown to the employer who will be 
randomly matched with you in the next period. [Screen with an empty table to be filled 
shown here.] 
3. Assume you have chosen an actual work effort of 8 in the last period, of 10 in the second to 
last period, and of 3 in the third to last period. Assume your employer offered a contract 
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without limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort. The offered wage is 25, 
the requested work effort is 10. You accept the contract offer. 
3.1. You choose an actual work effort of 10. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
3.2. You choose an actual work effort of 5. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
3.3. You choose an actual work effort of 1. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
4. Assume you have chosen an actual work effort of 8 in the last period, of 10 in the second to 
last period, and of 3 in the third to last period. Assume your employer offered a contract with 
limitation in choice possibilities with respect to work effort. The offered wage is 25, the 
requested work effort is 10. You accept the contract offer. 
4.1. You choose an actual work effort of 10. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
4.2. You choose an actual work effort of 5. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
4.3. You choose an actual work effort of 3. What is your income? What is the profit of your 
employer? 
5. Assume you are in period 5 of the experiment and you accepted a contract without limitation 
in the choice possibilities with respect to work effort. In the period 3 you chose a work effort 
of 8, in period 4 of 7. Which information will be shown to your next employer if you choose 
a work effort of 1 in the current period? Please complete the following table with information 
that would be shown to the employer who will be randomly matched with you in the next 
period. [Screen with an empty table to be filled shown here.] 
Please raise your hand when you have solved all the test questions. We will then come to your 
workplace and check your answers. 
[If a subject made a mistake, we explained the relevant part of the instructions again and asked 
the subject to try the question again. The experiment started only after all subjects had answered 
all questions correctly.] 
 
[End of instructions for the employees.] 
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The instructions in the competition treatment are basically equivalent to the instructions 
in the screening treatment. The difference is as follows. First, employers are informed that they 
receive information about past behavior not only from one but from four agents, and agents are 
informed that not only one but four employers will observe their current behavior in each future 
period. Second, employers are informed that they have to make a contract offer to each of the 
four agents, and agents are informed that they will receive four contract offers from each of the 
four employers. Finally, since the competition treatment lasted longer than the base and the 
screening treatments and since the participants played only 15 rounds (in the base and the 
screening treatment the respective other treatment was also played), the participants received a 
show-up fee of 20 CHF and the exchange rate was 10 points = 2.5 CHF. 
The English translation of the additional section of the instructions in the competition 
treatment explaining the matching protocol is as follows: 
 
[Begin of the section explaining the matching procedure in the competition treatment.] 
 
The assignment of employers and employees in a period 
Four employers and four employees are assigned to a group in each period (see diagram 1). The 
groups are made anew by the computer each period using a random device. This means that you 
will be in a new group of employees and employers each period. 
 
Employer 1 Employee 1 
Employer 2 Employee 2 
Employer 3 Employee 3 
Employer 4 Employee 4 
Diagram 1: Four employers and four employees are assigned to a group in each period. 
Each employer is informed of the average amount of work each of the four employees in his 
group completed in the last three periods. Each employer can offer a contract to each of the four 
employees. Each employer must then determine the order in which his offers are presented to the 
four employees. The pairing of employers and employees takes place in rounds (see diagram 2). 
Each employer determines which employee will be offered his contract offer in round 1, which 









Diagram 2: The pairing of employers and employees takes place over 4 rounds. 
An individual employer can only make a specific employee one offer. E.g., it is not possible to 
make employee 3 an offer both in rounds 1 and 2. Furthermore, an individual employer can only 
make one offer per round. It is not possible, e.g., for an employer to offer a contract to both 
employee 2 and to employee 4 in round 1. An employer thus makes each of the four employees 
one offer in exactly one round. An employee, however, can receive several offers (from various 
employers). It is also possible for an employee not to receive an offer in a round. 
Even though each employer offers a total of four labor contracts, only one of these 
contracts can be accepted. As soon as an employer's contract is accepted in a round, all of this 
employer's offers that should have been made in the later rounds lose their validity and will no 
longer be shown to the employees. In the same way, an employee can accept a maximum of one 
contract offer. (Each employee receives at least one offer, but may receive up to four offers in 
the course of the four rounds.) If an employee accepts a contract offer in one round, he will not 
receive any further offers in the subsequent rounds. Any contracts that the employee would have 
received from other employers automatically lose their validity and will no longer be shown. If 
an employee receives several contract offers in one round (from various employers), he can only 
accept one of these offers. 
It is thus neither possible for an employer to conclude contracts with several employees 
nor for an employee to conclude contracts with several employers. Each participant can thus 
enter into a maximum of one contractual relationship. It is possible, however, that an employer 
or an employee is not able to conclude a contract. This occurs with an employee if he rejects all 
contractual offers. This is the case for an employer if all employees reject his offers or have 
already accepted contractual offers from other employers. After the completion of four rounds, 
those employees with a contract choose their actual work effort. All employers and employees 
will then be informed of their profits or earnings in the corresponding period. Following this, the 
next period begins. 
 




In the following we present the original German instructions for the base and the 
screening treatment. We also include the additional section explaining the matching protocol in 
the competition treatment. 
 
[Begin of the German instructions for the employers in the base and screening treatment.] 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für die Teilnehmer 
Wir begrüssen Sie ganz herzlich zu diesem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Experiment. Wenn Sie 
die nachfolgenden Erklärungen genau lesen, dann können Sie – je nach Ihren Entscheidungen 
und den Entscheidungen der anderen Teilnehmer – zusätzlich zu den 10 Franken, die Sie als 
Startgeld für Ihre Teilnahme erhalten, Geld verdienen. Es ist daher sehr wichtig, dass Sie diese 
Erklärungen genau durchlesen. Wenn Sie Fragen haben, dann richten Sie diese bitte an uns. 
Während des Experiments ist es Ihnen nicht erlaubt, mit den anderen Teilnehmern am 
Experiment zu sprechen. Die Nichtbeachtung dieser Regel führt zum Ausschluss aus dem 
Experiment und allen Zahlungen. Während des Experiments sprechen wir nicht von Franken, 
sondern von Punkten. Ihr gesamtes Einkommen wird also zunächst in Punkten berechnet. Die 
von Ihnen während des Experiments erzielte Gesamtpunktezahl wird dann am Ende in Franken 
umgerechnet, wobei gilt 10 Punkte = 1,25 Franken. Am Ende der heutigen Sitzung bekommen 
Sie von uns die während des Experiments verdiente Punktezahl plus 10 Franken für das 




In diesem Experiment gibt es zwei Arten von Teilnehmern, Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer. Alle 
Teilnehmer sind gleichmäßig auf diese beiden Rollen aufgeteilt. Sie sind während des gesamten 
Experiments in der Rolle eines Arbeitgebers. Das Experiment läuft über 15 Perioden. In jeder 
Periode wird Ihnen per Zufallsentscheid einer der Arbeitnehmer neu zugeteilt. Weder während 
noch nach dem Experiment erfahren Sie die Identität der zugeteilten Personen. Diese erfahren 
ebenfalls nichts über Ihre Identität. Dadurch wird die volle Anonymität der Entscheidungen 
gewährleistet. Im Folgenden geben wir Ihnen zunächst einen Überblick über den Ablauf einer 
Periode. Detaillierte Informationen finden Sie auf den nächsten Seiten. 
Jede Periode des Experiments besteht aus zwei Stufen. Auf der ersten Stufe legen Sie als 
Arbeitgeber einen Arbeitsvertrag fest, den Sie Ihrem Arbeitnehmer anbieten: 1) Sie wählen die 
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Art des Arbeitsvertrages, den Sie Ihrem Arbeitnehmer anbieten. Sie können zwischen einem (i) 
Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit des Arbeitnehmers bei der Arbeitsmenge und 
einem (ii) Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit des Arbeitnehmers bei der 
Arbeitsmenge wählen. 2) Dann wählen Sie den Lohn, den Sie dem Arbeitnehmer anbieten 
wollen. 3) Anschliessend wählen Sie die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge.  
Ihre Entscheidungen auf der ersten Stufe werden Ihrem Arbeitnehmer mitgeteilt. Der 
Arbeitnehmer kann dann auf der zweiten Stufe auf den angebotenen Vertrag reagieren: 1) Er 
entscheidet, ob er den angebotenen Arbeitsvertrag annimmt oder ablehnt. 2) Falls er den 
Arbeitsvertrag annimmt, entscheidet er über die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Je grösser die 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge, desto grösser ist Ihr Gewinn. Dem Arbeitnehmer entstehen aus der 
tatsächlich gewählten Arbeitsmenge allerdings Kosten, die umso höher sind, je höher die 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Nach der zweiten Stufe ist eine Periode beendet. Die Entscheidungen 
von Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer bestimmen sowohl Ihren Gewinn wie auch das Einkommen 
des Arbeitnehmers in dieser Periode. Insgesamt gibt es 15 Perioden. Ihr Gesamtgewinn in 
diesem Experiment ist daher die Summe Ihrer Gewinne in den 15 Perioden. Das 
Gesamteinkommen eines Arbeitnehmers ist die Summe seiner Einkommen in den 15 Perioden. 
 
Detaillierte Informationen über den Ablauf einer Periode  
In jeder Periode wählen Sie die Art des Arbeitsvertrages, den Sie anbieten möchten: Sie können 
sich zwischen einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge 
und einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge entscheiden. 
Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit ist Ihr Arbeitnehmer – sofern er den 
Vertrag annimmt – gezwungen, mindestens eine Arbeitsmenge von 3 zu wählen. Bei einem 
Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit kann Ihr Arbeitnehmer auch eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 2 oder die minimale Arbeitsmenge von 1 wählen. Neben der Entscheidung 
über die Art des Vertrages, müssen Sie in jeder Periode den angebotenen Lohn und die 
gewünschte Arbeitsmenge festlegen. Ihr Arbeitnehmer ist nicht an die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge 
gebunden. Er kann auch eine höhere oder niedrigere Arbeitsmenge wählen. Bei einem Vertrag 
mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge muss Ihr Arbeitnehmer jedoch – 
sofern er den Vertrag annimmt – mindestens eine Arbeitsmenge von 3 wählen. Wenn der 
Arbeitnehmer den Vertrag annimmt, dann müssen Sie den angebotenen Lohn in jedem Fall 
zahlen, unabhängig von der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge des Arbeitnehmers. 
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Bezüglich der gewünschten und der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge gilt folgendes: Sie 
können als gewünschte Arbeitsmenge jeden ganzzahligen Wert zwischen 1 und 10 wählen. Die 
niedrigste Arbeitsmenge ist 1 und die höchste ist 10. Für den Gewinn, den Sie letztlich erzielen, 
ist nicht die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge, sondern die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge entscheidend. Bei 
einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge kann Ihr 
Arbeitnehmer als tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge ebenfalls jeden ganzzahligen Wert zwischen 1 und 
10 wählen. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge 
kann Ihr Arbeitnehmer als tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge nur einen ganzzahligen Wert zwischen 3 
und 10 wählen. Ihr Arbeitnehmer ist also gezwungen, mindestens eine Arbeitsmenge von 3 zu 
wählen. Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge 
verdienen Sie pro Einheit der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge 5 Punkte. Wenn die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 1 ist, dann verdienen Sie 5 x 1 = 5 Punkte, wenn die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 7 ist, dann verdienen Sie 5 x 7 = 35 Punkte, usw. Bei einem 
Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge verdienen Sie pro Einheit 
der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge 4 Punkte. Wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 3 
ist (das Minimum bei diesem Vertrag), dann verdienen Sie 4 x 3 = 12 Punkte, wenn die 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 7 ist, dann verdienen Sie 4 x 7 =28 Punkte, usw. 
Es gibt also zwei Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Arten von Verträgen. 1) Bei einem 
Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit kann Ihr Arbeitnehmer die minimale 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 1 wählen. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der 
Wahlmöglichkeit ist Ihr Arbeitnehmer gezwungen, mindestens eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge 
von 3 zu wählen. 2) Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit verdienen Sie 
5 Punkte pro tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahl-
möglichkeit verdienen Sie 4 Punkte pro tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. 
Für Ihren Arbeitnehmer ist die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge mit Kosten verbunden. Jede 
Einheit der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge kostet Ihren Arbeitnehmer 1 Punkt (unabhängig von der 
Art des Vertrages). Wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge 1 ist, dann kostet dies Ihren 
Arbeitnehmer 1 Punkt, wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge 2 ist, dann kostet dies Ihren 
Arbeitnehmer 2 Punkte, usw. Bezüglich des angebotenen Lohns gilt folgendes: Der angebotene 
Lohn muss die Kosten der gewünschten Arbeitsmenge abdecken. Wenn Sie beispielsweise eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 5 wünschen, dann muss der angebotene Lohn mindestens 5 betragen. 
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[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen in einer Periode treffen, wird Ihnen zu Ihrer Information eine 
Tabelle angezeigt. In dieser Tabelle ist angegeben, welche tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge Ihr 
momentaner Arbeitnehmer in den letzten 3 Perioden jeweils gewählt hat. Hat der Arbeitnehmer 
einen Vertrag abgelehnt, so steht an der entsprechenden Stelle „Vertrag abgelehnt“ anstatt der 
tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge. Sie erhalten in jeder Periode eine neue Tabelle, da Ihnen in jeder 
Periode einer der Arbeitnehmer neu zugewiesen wird. Ihr jeweiliger Arbeitnehmer weiss auch, 
dass Sie als Arbeitgeber seine Wahl der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge in den letzten 3 Perioden 
kennen. Wie die Tabelle zu verstehen ist: In der ersten Zeile der Tabelle (siehe Abbildung) steht 
die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge ihres momentanen Arbeitnehmers in der letzten Periode. In der 
zweiten Zeile die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge der vorletzten und in der dritten Zeile die 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge in der drittletzten Periode. Wurde in einer Periode der Vertrag 
abgelehnt, so finden Sie dort den Eintrag „Vertrag abgelehnt“. 
[Screen shot showing the table.] 
In den ersten drei Perioden des Experiments sind die Angaben in der Tabelle noch unvollständig, 
da es noch nicht genügend Vorperioden gibt. Der jeweilige Eintrag lautet dann „Angabe liegt 
noch nicht vor“. Erst ab Periode 4 liegen die Informationen über die letzten drei Perioden 
vollständig vor. 
Wenn Sie auf der ersten Stufe Ihre Entscheidungen über die Art des Vertrages, die Höhe 
des angebotenen Lohns und die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge getroffen haben, dann werden Ihre 
Entscheidungen Ihrem Arbeitnehmer mitgeteilt. Der Arbeitnehmer kann dann auf der zweiten 
Stufe entscheiden, ob er den angebotenen Arbeitsvertrag annimmt oder ablehnt. Falls er den 
Arbeitsvertrag annimmt, entscheidet er über die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Sobald Ihr 
Arbeitnehmer seine Entscheidungen getroffen hat, wird Ihnen ein Informationsbildschirm 
angezeigt. Dort erfahren Sie die Entscheidungen Ihres Arbeitnehmers, und Sie sehen auch 
nochmals Ihre eigenen Entscheidungen. Darüber hinaus werden Ihnen Ihr Gewinn und das 
Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers in dieser Periode angezeigt. Danach beginnt die nächste 
Periode. Das Experiment läuft insgesamt über 15 Perioden. In jeder Periode wird Ihnen per 
Zufallsentscheid einer der Arbeitnehmer neu zugeteilt. (Sollte die Anzahl der Teilnehmer am 
Experiment ungerade sein, so kann es vorkommen, dass Ihnen in einer Periode einmal kein 
Arbeitnehmer zugeteilt wird.)  
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Die Gewinn- und Einkommensberechnung am Ende jeder Periode 
Ihr Gewinn am Ende jeder Periode hängt sowohl von Ihren Entscheidungen, wie auch von den 
Entscheidungen Ihres Arbeitnehmers auf der zweiten Stufe ab. Ihr Gewinn am Ende des 
Experiments ist die Summe der Gewinne aus den 15 Perioden. Es gibt zwei Möglichkeiten, 
denen Sie am Ende jeder Periode gegenüberstehen können: 1) Ihr Arbeitnehmer lehnt den 
Vertrag ab. In diesem Fall müssen Sie den angebotenen Lohn nicht zahlen. Ihr Arbeitnehmer 
kann auch keine Arbeitsmenge wählen. Ihr Gewinn und das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers in 
dieser Periode sind somit jeweils 0 Punkte. 2) Ihr Arbeitnehmer nimmt den Vertrag an. In diesem 
Fall hängt Ihr Gewinn in Punkten in dieser Periode von der Art des Vertrages, dem angebotenen 
Lohn und der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge ab. Die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge spielt bei der 
Berechnung Ihres Gewinns keine Rolle. A) Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der 
Wahlmöglichkeit kann die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von Ihrem Arbeitnehmer zwischen 1 und 
10 gewählt werden. Ihr Gewinn berechnet sich dann wie folgt: Ihr Gewinn = 5 x tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge – angebotener Lohn. B) Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der 
Wahlmöglichkeit muss die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von Ihrem Arbeitnehmer zwischen 3 und 
10 gewählt werden. Ihr Gewinn berechnet sich dann wie folgt: Ihr Gewinn = 4 x tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge – angebotener Lohn.. Es kann also passieren, dass in einzelnen Perioden ein 
Verlust auftritt, wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge relativ gering und der Lohn relativ hoch ist. 
Diese Verluste werden mit den Gewinnen aus anderen Perioden oder mit dem Startgeld 
verrechnet. Bei Annahme des Vertrags hängt das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers in Punkten 
vom angebotenen Lohn und der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge ab. Das Einkommen eines 
Arbeitnehmers in einer Periode berechnet sich wie folgt: Einkommen des Arbeitnehmers = 
angebotener Lohn – tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. 
 
Ablauf am Computer 
Ihre Entscheidung über die Art des Vertrages, den angebotenen Lohn und die gewünschte 
Arbeitsmenge geben Sie in dem folgenden Computerbildschirm ein: 
[Screen shown here; in the screening treatment it includes information about an agent’s past 
effort choices.] 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Im oberen Teil des Bildschirms finden Sie die Tabelle mit den Angaben über die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge Ihres momentanen Arbeitnehmers in den letzten 3 Perioden. (Das Beispiel ist rein 
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willkürlich gewählt.) 
In der Mitte des Bildschirms sehen Sie die beiden Knöpfe „Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der 
Wahlmöglichkeit“ bzw. „Vertrag mit Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit“. Für Ihre 
Entscheidung klicken Sie den entsprechenden Knopf an. Dann legen Sie den angebotenen Lohn 
fest. Sie geben dazu die entsprechende Zahl in das obere blaue Feld ein. Schliesslich legen Sie 
die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge fest. Dazu geben Sie die entsprechende Zahl in das untere blaue 
Feld ein. Der angebotene Lohn muss mindestens die Kosten der gewünschten Arbeitsmenge 
abdecken. Wenn Sie Ihre Entscheidungen getroffen haben, drücken Sie den OK-Knopf. Solange 




[The grey shaded text and question number 3 is only included in the screening treatment.] 
1. Angenommen Ihr Vertragsangebot wurde abgelehnt. Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn? Wie hoch ist 
das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
2. Angenommen Sie wollen eine gewünschte Arbeitsmenge von 7 festlegen. Wie lautet der 
Mindestlohn, den Sie anbieten müssen? 
3. Angenommen Sie sehen folgende Informationstabelle auf Ihrem Bildschirm. [Screen shows 
that the employer chose a work effort of 5 in the last and of 8 in the second to last period. 
For the third to last period it says “information not yet available.”] 
3.1. In welcher Periode des Experiments befinden Sie sich? 
3.2. Welche tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge hat Ihr Arbeitnehmer in der ersten Periode des 
Experiments gewählt? 
4. Angenommen Ihr momentaner Arbeitnehmer hat in der letzten Periode eine tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge von 8, in der vorletzten Periode von 10 und in der drittletzten Periode von 3 
gewählt. Sie bieten einen Vertrag ohne Einschränkung bei der Wahlmöglichkeit der 
Arbeitsmenge an. Der angebotene Lohn beträgt 25, die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge beträgt 10. 
Ihr Arbeitnehmer nimmt den Vertrag an. 
4.1. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 10. Wie hoch ist Ihr 
Gewinn? Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
4.2. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 5. Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn? 
Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
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4.3. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 1. Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn? 
Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
5. Angenommen Ihr momentaner Arbeitnehmer hat in der letzten Periode eine tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge von 8, in der vorletzten Periode von 10 und in der drittletzten Periode von 3 
gewählt. Sie bieten einen Vertrag mit Einschränkung bei der Wahlmöglichkeit der 
Arbeitsmenge an. Der angebotene Lohn beträgt 25, die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge beträgt 10. 
Ihr Arbeitnehmer nimmt den Vertrag an. 
5.1. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 10. Wie hoch ist Ihr 
Gewinn? Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
5.2. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 5. Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn? 
Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
5.3. Ihr Arbeitnehmer wählt eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 3. Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn? 
Wie hoch ist das Einkommen Ihres Arbeitnehmers? 
Wenn Sie alle Aufgaben gelöst haben, strecken Sie bitte auf. Wir kommen dann zu Ihnen und 
überprüfen Ihre Antworten. Wenn wir Ihre Antworten kontrolliert haben, dann ist es sinnvoll, 
wenn Sie über Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment schon einmal gründlich nachdenken. 
 




[Begin of instructions for the employees in the base and screening treatment.] 
 
Allgemeine Erklärungen für die Teilnehmer 
[Same text as in instructions for employers.]  
 
Das Experiment 
In diesem Experiment gibt es zwei Arten von Teilnehmern, Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer. Alle 
Teilnehmer sind gleichmäßig auf diese beiden Rollen aufgeteilt. Sie sind während des gesamten 
Experiments in der Rolle eines Arbeitnehmers. Das Experiment läuft über 15 Perioden. In jeder 
Periode wird Ihnen per Zufallsentscheid einer der Arbeitgeber neu zugeteilt. Weder während 
noch nach dem Experiment erfahren Sie die Identität der zugeteilten Personen. Diese erfahren 
ebenfalls nichts über Ihre Identität. Dadurch wird die volle Anonymität der Entscheidungen 
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gewährleistet. Im Folgenden geben wir Ihnen zunächst einen Überblick über den Ablauf einer 
Periode. Detaillierte Informationen finden Sie auf den nächsten Seiten. 
Jede Periode des Experiments besteht aus zwei Stufen. Auf der ersten Stufe legt Ihr 
Arbeitgeber den Arbeitsvertrag fest, den er Ihnen als Arbeitnehmer anbietet: 1) Ihr Arbeitgeber 
wählt zunächst die Art des Arbeitsvertrages, den er Ihnen anbietet. Er kann einen (i) Vertrag 
ohne Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge oder einen (ii) Vertrag mit 
Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge vorschlagen. 2) Dann wählt Ihr 
Arbeitgeber den Lohn, den er Ihnen anbietet. 3) Schliesslich wählt er auch noch die 
Arbeitsmenge, die er sich von ihnen wünscht. Auf der zweiten Stufe erfahren Sie, welchen 
Vertrag der Arbeitgeber Ihnen anbietet. Sie können dann auf diesen Vertrag reagieren: 1) Sie 
entscheiden, ob Sie den Arbeitsvertrag annehmen oder ablehnen. 2) Falls Sie den Arbeitsvertrag 
annehmen, entscheiden Sie über die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Nach der zweiten Stufe ist eine 
Periode beendet. Die Entscheidungen von Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer bestimmen sowohl Ihr 
Einkommen wie auch den Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers in dieser Periode. Insgesamt gibt es 15 
Perioden. Ihr Gesamteinkommen in diesem Experiment ist daher die Summe Ihrer Einkommen 
in den 15 Perioden. Der Gesamtgewinn eines Arbeitgebers ist die Summe seiner Gewinne in den 
15 Perioden. 
 
Detaillierte Informationen über den Ablauf einer Periode 
In jeder Periode entscheidet sich Ihr jeweiliger Arbeitgeber ob er Ihnen einem Vertrag ohne 
Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge oder einem Vertrag mit 
Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge anbietet. Der Unterschied zwischen 
den beiden Verträgen besteht darin, dass Sie – sofern Sie den Vertrag annehmen – bei einem 
Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit gezwungen sind, mindestens eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 3 zu wählen. Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit 
können Sie auch eine Arbeitsmenge von 2 oder die minimale Arbeitsmenge von 1 wählen. 
Neben der Entscheidung über die Art des Vertrages, muss Ihr Arbeitgeber den angebotenen Lohn 
und die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge festlegen. Sie sind jedoch nicht an die gewünschte 
Arbeitsmenge gebunden. Sie können – sofern Sie den Vertrag annehmen – auch eine höhere oder 
niedrigere Arbeitsmenge wählen. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit 
bei der Arbeitsmenge müssen Sie jedoch – sofern Sie den Vertrag annehmen – mindestens eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 3 wählen. Wenn Sie den Vertrag annehmen, dann muss Ihnen Ihr Arbeitgeber 
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den angebotenen Lohn in jedem Fall zahlen, unabhängig von der Arbeitsmenge, die Sie wählen. 
Wenn Sie den Vertrag ablehnen, dann zahlt Ihnen Ihr Arbeitgeber keinen Lohn. Sie können dann 
auch keine Arbeitsmenge wählen. 
Bezüglich der gewünschten und tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge gilt folgendes: Ihr 
Arbeitgeber kann als gewünschte Arbeitsmenge jeden ganzzahligen Wert zwischen 1 und 10 
wählen. Die niedrigste Arbeitsmenge ist 1 und die höchste ist 10. Für den Gewinn, den Ihr 
Arbeitgeber erzielt, ist jedoch nicht die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge, sondern die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge entscheidend. Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei 
der Arbeitsmenge können Sie als tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge ebenfalls jeden ganzzahligen Wert 
zwischen 1 und 10 wählen. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der 
Arbeitsmenge können Sie die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge nur zwischen 3 und 10 wählen. Sie sind 
also gezwungen, mindestens eine Arbeitsmenge von 3 zu wählen. Bei einem Vertrag ohne 
Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit verdient Ihr Arbeitgeber pro Einheit der tatsächlichen 
Arbeitsmenge 5 Punkte. Wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 1 ist, dann verdient 
er 5 x 1 = 5 Punkte, wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 7 ist, dann verdient er 5 
x 7 = 35 Punkte, usw. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit verdient Ihr 
Arbeitgeber pro Einheit der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge 4 Punkte. Wenn die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 3 ist (das Minimum bei diesem Vertrag), dann verdient er 4 x 3 = 
12 Punkte, wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge beispielsweise 7 ist, dann verdient er 4 x 7 = 28 
Punkte, usw.  
Es gibt also zwei Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Arten von Verträgen. 1) Bei einem 
Vertrag ohne Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit können Sie die minimale tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge von 1 wählen. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit sind 
Sie gezwungen, mindestens eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 3 zu wählen. 2) Bei einem 
Vertrag ohne Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit verdient Ihr Arbeitgeber 5 Punkte pro 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit 
verdient Ihr Arbeitgeber 4 Punkte pro tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. 
Für Sie ist die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge mit Kosten verbunden. Jede Einheit tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge kostet Sie 1 Punkt (unabhängig von der Art des Vertrages). Wenn Sie die 
tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge 1 wählen, dann kostet Sie dies 1 Punkt, wenn Sie die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge 2 wählen, dann kostet Sie dies 2 Punkte, usw. Wenn Ihr Arbeitgeber auf der ersten 
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Stufe seine Entscheidungen über die Art des Vertrages, die Höhe des angebotenen Lohns und die 
gewünschte Arbeitsmenge getroffen hat, dann werden diese Ihnen mitgeteilt. Sie müssen dann 
auf der zweiten Stufe entscheiden, ob Sie den Vertrag annehmen oder ablehnen möchten. Wenn 
Sie den Arbeitsvertrag annehmen, müssen Sie über Ihre tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge entscheiden. 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Bevor Sie Ihre Entscheidungen in einer Periode treffen, wird Ihnen zu Ihrer Information eine 
Tabelle angezeigt. In dieser Tabelle ist Ihre tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge in den letzten 3 Perioden 
angegeben. Haben Sie einen Vertrag abgelehnt, so steht an der entsprechenden Stelle „Vertrag 
abgelehnt“ anstatt der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge. Dieselbe Tabelle, die Ihnen angezeigt wird, 
wird auch Ihrem jeweiligen Arbeitgeber angezeigt bevor dieser den Arbeitsvertrag festlegt. In 
jeder Periode erfährt also Ihr jeweiliger Arbeitgeber, welche tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge Sie in 
den letzten 3 Perioden jeweils gewählt haben. Das bedeutet auch, dass die Arbeitsmenge, welche 
Sie in der laufenden Periode wählen, Ihren nächsten Arbeitgebern bekannt sein wird. Nachdem 
Ihrem Arbeitgeber die Tabelle angezeigt wurde, legt er den Arbeitsvertrag fest, den er Ihnen 
anbietet. Wie die Tabelle zu verstehen ist: In der ersten Zeile der Tabelle (siehe Abbildung) steht 
die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge, die Sie in der letzten Periode gewählt haben. In der zweiten Zeile 
die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge der vorletzten und in der dritten Zeile die tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge in der drittletzten Periode. Haben Sie in einer Periode Ihren Vertrag abgelehnt, so 
finden Sie den Eintrag „Vertrag abgelehnt“. 
[Screen shot showing the table.] 
In den ersten drei Perioden des Experiments sind die Angaben in der Tabelle noch unvollständig, 
da es noch nicht genügend Vorperioden gibt. Der jeweilige Eintrag lautet dann „Angabe liegt 
noch nicht vor“. Erst ab Periode 4 liegen die Informationen über die letzten drei Perioden 
vollständig vor. 
Sobald Sie Ihre Entscheidungen getroffen haben, wird Ihnen ein Informationsbildschirm 
angezeigt. Dort erfahren Sie nochmals die Entscheidungen Ihres Arbeitgebers und Ihre eigenen 
Entscheidungen. Darüber hinaus werden Ihnen Ihr Einkommen und der Gewinn Ihres 
Arbeitgebers in dieser Periode angezeigt. Danach beginnt die nächste Periode. Das Experiment 
läuft insgesamt über 15 Perioden. In jeder Periode wird Ihnen per Zufallsentscheid einer der 
Arbeitgeber neu zugeteilt. (Sollte die Anzahl der Teilnehmer am Experiment ungerade sein, so 
kann es vorkommen, dass Ihnen in einer Periode einmal kein Arbeitgeber zugeteilt wird.)
39 
Die Einkommens- und Gewinnberechnung am Ende jeder Periode 
Ihr Einkommen am Ende jeder Periode hängt sowohl von Ihren Entscheidungen, wie auch von 
den Entscheidungen Ihres Arbeitgebers auf der ersten Stufe ab. Ihr Einkommen am Ende des 
Experiments ist die Summe Ihrer Einkommen aus den 15 Perioden. Es gibt zwei Möglichkeiten, 
denen Sie am Ende jeder Periode gegenüberstehen können: 1) Sie lehnen den Vertrag ab. In 
diesem Fall muss Ihr Arbeitgeber den angebotenen Lohn nicht zahlen. Sie können auch keine 
Arbeitsmenge wählen. Ihr Einkommen und der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers in dieser Periode sind 
somit jeweils 0 Punkte. 2) Sie nehmen den Vertrag an. In diesem Fall hängt Ihr Einkommen in 
Punkten in dieser Periode vom angebotenen Lohn und der tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge ab. Die 
gewünschte Arbeitsmenge hat keinen Einfluss auf Ihr Einkommen. Ihr Einkommen berechnet 
sich wie folgt: Ihr Einkommen = angebotener Lohn – tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge. Der Gewinn 
Ihres Arbeitgebers in Punkten hängt von der Art des Vertrages, dem angebotenen Lohn und der 
tatsächlichen Arbeitsmenge ab. Die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge spielt bei der Berechnung des 
Gewinns keine Rolle. A) Bei einem Vertrag ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit berechnet 
sich der Gewinn in einer Periode wie folgt: Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers = 5 x tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge – angebotener Lohn. B) Bei einem Vertrag mit Einschränkung der 
Wahlmöglichkeit berechnet sich der Gewinn in einer Periode wie folgt: Gewinn Ihres 
Arbeitgebers = 4 x tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge – angebotener Lohn. Es kann also passieren, dass 
ein Arbeitgeber in einzelnen Perioden einen Verlust macht, wenn die tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge 
relativ gering und der Lohn relativ hoch ist. Der Arbeitgeber muss diesen Verlust aus den 
Gewinnen anderer Perioden oder aus seinem Startgeld begleichen. 
 
Ablauf am Computer 
Ihre Entscheidung, ob Sie den Vertrag annehmen oder ablehnen und die Wahl Ihrer tatsächlichen 
Arbeitsmenge im Falle einer Annahme geben Sie in dem folgenden Computerbildschirm ein: 
[Screen shown here; in the screening treatment it includes information about an agent’s past 
effort choices.] 
[The following, grey shaded text is only included in the screening treatment.] 
Im oberen Teil des Bildschirms finden Sie die Tabelle mit den Angaben über Ihre tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge in den letzten 3 Perioden. (Das Beispiel ist rein willkürlich gewählt.) 
In der Mitte des Bildschirms sehen Sie die Art des Vertrages, den angebotenen Lohn und die 
gewünschte Arbeitsmenge. (Der Vertrag, der Ihnen im Experiment angeboten wird, kann vom 
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obigen, willkürlich gewählten Beispiel abweichen.) Darunter finden Sie rechts neben der Frage 
„Nehmen Sie den Vertrag an?“ die beiden Knöpfe „Ja“ bzw. „Nein“. Für Ihre Entscheidung 
klicken Sie den jeweiligen Knopf an. Falls Sie den Vertrag annehmen, so müssen Sie eine 
Arbeitsmenge wählen. Dazu geben Sie die entsprechende Zahl in das blaue Feld ein. Falls Sie 
den Vertrag ablehnen, so können Sie keine Arbeitsmenge eingeben. Wenn Sie Ihre 
Entscheidungen getroffen haben, drücken Sie den OK-Knopf. Solange dieser Knopf nicht 
gedrückt wurde, können Sie Ihre Entscheidungen noch revidieren. Haben Sie noch Fragen? 
 
Übungsaufgaben 
[The grey shaded text and questions number 2 and 5 are only included in the screening 
treatment.] 
1. Angenommen Sie lehnen das Vertragsangebot ab. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie hoch 
ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
2. Angenommen Sie sehen folgende Informationstabelle auf Ihrem Bildschirm. [Screen shows 
that the employer chose a work effort of 5 in the last and of 8 in the second to last period. 
For the third to last period it says “information not yet available.”] 
2.1. In welcher Periode des Experiments befinden Sie sich? 
2.2. Welche tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge haben Sie in der ersten Periode des Experiments 
gewählt? 
2.3. Angenommen Sie wählen in der jetzigen Periode eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 3. 
Bitte vervollständigen Sie die unten stehende Informationstabelle, die demjenigen 
Arbeitgeber gezeigt wird, der Ihnen in der nächsten Periode des Experiments per 
Zufallsentscheid zugeordnet wird. [Screen with an empty table to be filled shown here.] 
3. Angenommen Sie haben in der letzten Periode eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 8, in der 
vorletzten Periode von 10 und in der drittletzten Periode von 3 gewählt. Ihr Arbeitgeber hat 
Ihnen einen Vertrag ohne Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge 
angeboten. Der angebotene Lohn beträgt 25, die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge beträgt 10. Sie 
nehmen den Vertrag an. 
3.1. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 10. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
3.2. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 5. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
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3.3. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 1. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
4. Angenommen Sie haben in der letzten Periode eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 8, in der 
vorletzten Periode von 10 und in der drittletzten Periode von 3 gewählt. Ihr Arbeitgeber hat 
Ihnen einen Vertrag mit Einschränkung Ihrer Wahlmöglichkeit bei der Arbeitsmenge 
angeboten. Der angebotene Lohn beträgt 25, die gewünschte Arbeitsmenge beträgt 10. Sie 
nehmen den Vertrag an. 
4.1. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 10. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
4.2. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 5. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
4.3. Sie wählen eine tatsächliche Arbeitsmenge von 3. Wie hoch ist Ihr Einkommen? Wie 
hoch ist der Gewinn Ihres Arbeitgebers? 
5. Angenommen Sie befinden sich in der 5. Periode des Experimentes und haben einen Vertrag 
ohne Einschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeit akzeptiert. In der dritten Periode haben Sie eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 8, in der vierten Periode eine Arbeitsmenge von 7 gewählt. Welche 
Informationen erhält dann Ihr nächster Arbeitgeber, wenn Sie in der laufenden Periode eine 
Arbeitsmenge von 1 wählen? Bitte tragen Sie Ihre Antwort in die untenstehende 
Informationstabelle für den Arbeitgeber ein. [Screen with an empty table to be filled shown 
here.] 
Wenn Sie alle Aufgaben gelöst haben, strecken Sie bitte auf. Wir kommen dann zu Ihnen und 
überprüfen Ihre Antworten. Wenn wir Ihre Antworten kontrolliert haben, dann ist es sinnvoll, 
wenn Sie über Ihre Entscheidungen im Experiment schon einmal gründlich nachdenken. 
[If a subject made a mistake, we explained the relevant part of the instructions again and asked 
the subject to try the question again. The experiment started only after all subjects had answered 
all questions correctly.] 
 
[End of instructions for the employees.] 
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In the following we provide the part of the original German instructions explaining the 
matching protocol in the competition treatment. 
 
[Begin of the section explaining the matching procedure in the competition treatment.] 
 
Die Zuordnung von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern in einer Periode 
In jeder Periode werden jeweils vier Arbeitgeber und vier Arbeitnehmer einander zugeordnet 
(siehe Abbildung 1). Die Gruppen werden im Zufallsverfahren durch den Computer in jeder 
Periode neu zusammengestellt. Sie befinden sich somit in jeder Periode in einer neuen Gruppe 
mit neuen Arbeitnehmern und neuen anderen Arbeitgebern.  
[Diagram 1 shown here.] 
Jeder Arbeitgeber erfährt zu Beginn einer Periode die durchschnittliche Arbeitsmenge in 
den letzten drei Perioden jedes einzelnen der vier Arbeitnehmer in seiner Gruppe. Dann 
bestimmt jeder Arbeitgeber für jeden der vier Arbeitnehmer ein Vertragsangebot. Schliesslich 
muss jeder Arbeitgeber die Reihenfolge festlegen, in der seine Angebote den vier Arbeitnehmern 
vorgelegt werden sollen. Die Zuordnung von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern erfolgt in Runden 
(siehe Abbildung 2). Jeder Arbeitgeber legt fest, welchem Arbeitnehmer sein Vertragsangebot in 
Runde 1 gemacht werden soll, welchem in Runde 2, welchem in Runde 3 und welchem in Runde 
4. 
[Diagram 2 shown here.] 
Ein einzelner Arbeitgeber kann einem bestimmten Arbeitnehmer nur ein Angebot 
machen. Es ist nicht möglich, dass ein Arbeitgeber beispielsweise dem Arbeitnehmer 3 sowohl 
in Runde 1 wie auch in Runde 2 ein Angebot macht. Ebenso kann ein einzelner Arbeitgeber pro 
Runde nur ein Angebot machen. Es ist nicht möglich, dass ein Arbeitgeber beispielsweise 
sowohl dem Arbeitnehmer 2 wie auch dem Arbeitnehmer 4 ein Angebot in Runde 1 
unterbreitet.Ein Arbeitgeber macht also jedem der vier Arbeitnehmer in genau einer Runde ein 
Angebot. Ein Arbeitnehmer kann jedoch in einer Runde mehrere Angebote (von verschiedenen 
Arbeitgebern) bekommen. Es kann auch vorkommen, dass ein Arbeitnehmer in einer Runde kein 
Angebot bekommt.  
Obwohl jeder Arbeitgeber insgesamt vier Arbeitsverträge anbietet, kann höchstens einer 
dieser Verträge angenommen werden. Sobald in einer Runde ein Angebot eines Arbeitgebers 
angenommen wurde, verlieren automatisch die Angebote dieses Arbeitgebers, die in den 
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folgenden Runden gemacht werden sollten, ihre Gültigkeit und werden den jeweiligen 
Arbeitnehmern nicht mehr angezeigt. 
Ebenso kann ein Arbeitnehmer höchstens ein Vertragsangebot annehmen. (Jeder 
Arbeitnehmer bekommt mindestens ein Angebot, kann aber bis zu vier Angebote im Laufe der 
vier Runden bekommen.) Wenn ein Arbeitnehmer in einer Runde ein Vertragsangebot 
angenommen hat, so bekommt er in den darauffolgenden Runden keine weiteren Angebote mehr. 
Alle Verträge, die dem Arbeitnehmer in den folgenden Runden von anderen Arbeitgebern 
angeboten worden wären, verlieren automatisch ihre Gültigkeit und werden nicht mehr 
angezeigt. Auch wenn ein Arbeitnehmer in einer Runde mehrere Vertragsangebote (von 
verschiedenen Arbeitgebern) bekommt, kann er höchstens eines dieser Angebote annehmen. 
Es ist also nicht möglich, dass ein Arbeitgeber Verträge mit mehreren Arbeitnehmern 
abschliesst oder dass ein Arbeitnehmer Verträge von mehreren Arbeitgebern annimmt. Pro 
Periode kann jeder Teilnehmer maximal eine Vertragsbeziehung eingehen. Es kann jedoch 
vorkommen, dass ein Arbeitgeber oder ein Arbeitnehmer gar keinen Vertrag abschliessen. Bei 
einem Arbeitnehmer ist das der Fall, wenn er alle seine Vertragsangebote ablehnt. Bei einem 
Arbeitgeber ist das der Fall, wenn alle Arbeitnehmer seine Vertragsangebote ablehnen oder 
schon Vertragsangebote anderer Arbeitgeber angenommen haben. Nach Ablauf von Runde 4 
wählen diejenigen Arbeitnehmer, die einen Vertrag angenommen haben, ihre tatsächliche 
Arbeitsmenge.Dann werden alle Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer über ihren Gewinn bzw. ihr 
Einkommen in der gegebenen Periode informiert. Danach beginnnt die nächste Periode. 
 
[End of the section.] 
 
